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In February of 2015, Sadhvi Prachi, a member of the Hindu nationalist 
organization the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) as well as the current ruling political 
party of India, the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), implored Hindu women to each 
produce four children. She claimed that every child would contribute to the 
protection and preservation of Indian borders, society and culture. Speaking at a 
public event in Delhi she explained the value of this directive:  
 If there is one child, where all will you send him? To 
protect the border... or make him a scientist or he will 
take care of business.... So, we need four children. One 
can go to protect the borders, one can serve the society, 
give one to the saints and one to VHP to serve the nation 
and protect the culture. This is very important.  
Sadhvi Prachi’s comments draw an association between women’s reproductive 
capacities and national security which include the preservation of territorial 
boundaries (“the borders”), Hindu spirituality (“saints”) and culture (“protect the 
culture”). The inclusion of the VHP in her narrative makes clear that the conception 
of national service and culture she is alluding to is Hindu nationalist in character. 
Moreover, she echoes the themes of ​seva ​(service)​, suraksha ​(protection)​, 
dharma ​(religious duty)​ ​and ​ samksara ​(pious disposition)​ ​which are central tenets 
of the Hindu nationalist movement. In a later statement, she says that she does not 
want women to simply procreate, producing multiple children like “puppies”, but 
that they should raise Hindu nationalist subjects who will contribute to the 
preservation and protection of the nation.  
Sadhvi Prachi is a prominent ascetic of the Hindu nationalist movement who 
contested the Assembly elections from the Purkazi constituency in Uttar Pradesh 
(UP) in 2012. Her comments were disregarded as a minority sentiment by the BJP, 
which explicitly distanced itself from her opinion. BJP’s chief in UP, Laxmikant 
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Bajpai, declared: “under such circumstances, there is no significance of such remarks 
(“Asked people to have 4 kids, not 40 puppies: BJP's Sadhvi Prachi stokes new 
controversy”). While it is unclear which “circumstances” he is referring to, it may be 
assumed that he was alluding to the Delhi state elections, which took place two weeks 
after Prachi’s comment. BJP’s loss to the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) had already been 
predicted by this point, making it an imperative to maintain a distance from what are 
perceived as the more radical, militant Hindu nationalist organizations.  
In response to criticism for her comments from popular media and activists, 
Prachi argued that her directive was urgent because of the prevalence of forced 
conversions. She has also been a vocal advocate of the ​Ghar Wapsi ​(literally: 
returning home) campaign, a program which emphasizes the idea that non-Hindus 
were all once Hindus who have forcefully been converted to other religions, 
especially Islam and Christianity. Prachi has also claimed that ​re​conversion of 
non-Hindus to Hinduism should continue until 15 crore (150 million) people have 
been converted (ibid.).  
The campaign to “reconvert” non-Hindus has been accompanied with Hindu 
nationalist advocacy on the issue of “forced conversions”, which according to Hindu 
nationalists are rampant at the moment. These have included fears of “Love Jihad” a 
supposed conspiracy by Muslim groups that involves seduction, marriage and 
forceful conversion of Hindu women by Muslim men who have disguised themselves 
as Hindu men. Invoking the concept of Love Jihad, Sadhvi Prachi claimed: 
‘They (author’s note: Muslims) are trapping our 
daughters through 'love jihad'. These people who give 
birth to 35-40.... are spreading love jihad... They are 
trying to make Hindustan into Darul Islam’  
        (ibid.) 
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This statement makes evident the urgency of Sadhvi Prachi’s directive which is based 
on fears of Muslims gaining demographic supremacy over Hindus.  
Significantly, women are central to Sadhvi Prachi’s above statements. Not only 
is Sadhvi Prachi herself female, she directs her comments at women, urging them to 
reproduce more children. Moreover, she makes evident that these children are vital 
specifically so that they may become Hindu nationalist subjects in service of the 
nation’s territorial security and cultural preservation. Moreover, she alludes to the 
perceived demographic threat of Muslims, pointing to the widespread fear that 
Muslims reproduce in large numbers and have also been gaining numbers due to 
participating in Love Jihad. The combination of these anxieties draw attention to a 
relationship between women’s responsibilities towards (re)producing Hindu 
nationalist subjects as well as the promotion of anti-Muslim sentiment which is 
central to Hindu nationalist ideology. The aim of my project is to unpack the 
relationship between conceptions of gender and women’s roles which are central to 
the development of anti-Muslimness within Hindu nationalism. First, a brief 
historical and organizational background of the Hindu nationalist movement.  
 
Hindu Nationalist Movement: A Brief Background  
Ideological History 
Hindu nationalist organizations are collectively known as the ​Sangh Parivar 
(Family of the Sangh; hereafter the ‘Sangh’), due to their association with the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (literally: National Volunteer Organization; RSS). The 
Sangh defines its goal in terms of “uniting” Hindu society and preserving “its culture” 
through raising awareness of a “glorious” collective past for its revival in the future. 
 
4 
The historical period considered glorious, “a Golden Age”, is said to have 
deteriorated due to “foreign invasion” (Mughal and British) or the “Age of Decline” 
(Bachhetta, “Babri Masjid”, 273). Thus, the objective for the Sangh has been the 
“restoration” of the Hindu ​Rashtra ​(nation) within the current political apparatus by 
claiming that Hindus are the only legitimate citizens who have eternally belonged to 
the territories of ​akhanda Bharat ​(undivided India)​. 
The primary organization of the Sangh, the RSS, came into being in 1925, 
primarily inspired by the 1923 publication by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar’s 
Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?. ​Savarkar’s book identified Hindus as the only 
community to have legitimate citizenship rights to the Indian territory. Several 
scholars have pointed out that the conceptions of history, temporality, racialized 
identity, and nationhood that have been central for Hindu nationalist ideology 
developed along with British colonial periodizations and gendered characterizations 
of Indian history and society (Bhatt; Jefferlot). This points to the distinctly modern 
nature of Hindu nationalism, despite its emphasis on the timelessness of Hindu 
culture, identity and practice.  
Upper caste/class personalities who were significant in shaping the RSS as an 
organization were influenced by complex intellectual flows between Europe and 
India. These theoretical strands were central to the formation of elite Hindu identity 
in colonial north and central India. Hindu nationalism has also co-opted and 
instrumentalized classical (Brahminical) texts to propagate a homogeneous, cohesive 
and racialized Hindu identity. Theories of “primordial nationalism” which have 
framed Hindu nationalist organizations since their advent were influenced by 
transnational theories of Aryanism. These were central to “neo-Hindu” organizations 
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such as the Arya Samaj, which was founded in the late 19th century and promoted 
anti-Christian, anti-Muslim nationalism, as well as the Hindu Mahasabha, which 
developed in the early 20th century (Bhatt 3). The second ​sarsanghachalak​ of the 
RSS, MS Golwalkar also drew upon theories of Italian and German nationalisms to 
conceptualize a homogeneous and cohesive Hindu identity tied to national territory 
(Bacchetta, “Babri Masjid”, 273).  
At the core of Hindu nationalism are a complex web of theories of indigenous 
hierarchies, interpretations of Brahminical texts, colonial conceptions of time, 
religion, territory and nationalism. Significantly, these have developed ideas of 
Hindu inclusion and Christian and Muslim exclusion, based on the narrative of past 
Hindu oppression under Mughal and British rule. This has culminated in the 
objective of establishing the Hindu Rashtra, where a culturally and religiously 
cohesive polity rules the state. Ideas about gender have been central for the 
development of these ideologies and instrumental in the formation of the Hindu self 
opposed to Muslim and Christian others that has been essential to the development 
of nationalist ideology 
 
Organizational Structure  
The RSS and several of its offshoots function on a national, state and regional 
scale. The Sangh has a hierarchical structure and also appoints ​sarsanghchalaks 
(leaders). While the Sangh has described itself as a “non-political”, cultural 
organization, political parties such as the now defunct Jana Sangh and the BJP are a 
part of it. Moreover, the Sangh has been prominent in sociopolitical debates and 
provides para-military and ideological training at ​shakha ​(neighborhood cell) 
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meetings. Since 1926, the ​shakha​ has been a central feature of the RSS and later, of 
other organizations. Traditionally, ​shakha​ meetings take place daily, instituting a 
routine of physical exercise and drills, martial and weapon training, lectures, playing 
sports, Hindu nationalist prayer sessions which involve praying to deities, ​Bharat 
Mata ​(Mother India), and saluting the iconic saffron flag. Thus, the ​shakha​ utilizes 
disciplinary techniques which contribute to the the creation of Hindu nationalist 
“docile bodies” (Foucault 136). 
The Sangh Parivar is comprised of a variety of organizations which overlap 
ideologically or in membership with the RSS. These not only include the political 
organizations mentioned above but also others dedicated to vocational training, 
community care, professional unions and issue-related organizations. Exclusive 
female organizations, such as the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti (National Volunteer’s 
Committee; hereafter, the ‘Samiti’), formed in 1936, have also played a significant 
role in the development of Hindu nationalism. Significantly, the RSS and the Samiti 
do not necessarily ascribe to identical theories but are involved in a similar project of 
establishing Hindu supremacy (Bacchetta, “Ideologues”).  
Another important organization of the Sangh is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(World Hindu Organization; hereafter ‘VHP’). Formed in 1964, the organization 
works towards “consolidating” and “strengthening” Hindus within and outside of 
India. The VHP functions with the objective of expanding “Hindu society” through 
reaching out to Hindus abroad, emphasizing cohesion through eliminating caste and 
class differences, preventing “forced conversions” and “reconverting” Muslims. Much 
of the funding for VHP based activities comes from Hindus in the USA and Britain ​.  
1
1 For a discussion on transnational flow of money into the Sangh Parivar, see McKean, “Divine 
Enterprise” 
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The Babri Masjid Affair 
The VHP has been primarily known for mobilizing efforts around the 
Ramjanmabhoomi ​(birthplace of Ram), which lead to the destruction of the Babri 
Masjid, a sixteenth century mosque built by Babar in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. Hindu 
nationalist groups claimed that the Babri Masjid had been built in place of a temple 
commemorating the birthplace of Rama, from the epic ​Ramayana​. The 
Ramjanmabhoomi ​ movement was organized to campaign for the replacement of the 
Babri Masjid by a Rama temple. The ​Ramjanmabhoomi ​ has also often been cited as 
a moment when female participants of the Sangh rose to significance, being involved 
in advocacy and militancy. Sadhvis such as Sadhvi Rithambara and Uma Bharati 
were at the forefront of this movement, motivating the crowds which had gathered. 
As Kalyani Devaki Menon notes, Sadhvis were also formally organized with the 
establishment of the Sadhvi Shakti Parishad (Organization of Sadhvi Strength) by the 
VHP (80). 
 
Nationalism and “the Patriarchy”  
Theories of nation-building and political identity which are central to Hindu 
nationalism are, like other nationalisms, constituted on conceptions of gender and 
sexuality. Hierarchies of gender are based on conceptions of inclusion and exclusion, 
of formulating a united self as opposed to a different Other. Women have been 
construed as symbols, biological reproducers and advocates for the nation. 
Moreover, they have played an active role in the construction of nationalist 
movements, subjects and culture. Integrating power structures, of gender, race and 
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sexuality, which stem from colonialism and the colonial gaze are also central to 
understanding the development of postcolonial nationalisms.  
As Edward Said points out in ​Orientalism, ​colonial administrators perceived 
the Orient itself as feminine and it was “created as the weak, irrational, non-martial 
‘other’ in contrast to a strong martial European ‘self’” (Banerjee 169-170). In the 
context of British colonialism in India, Hindu men were perceived as especially 
effeminate . Sikata Banerjee has argued that Indian masculinity was held in contrast 2
to an ideal of “Christian manliness” developed in the 19th century, which included a 
range of attitudes surrounding one’s body, morality, social relations and community 
structures. This notion of masculinity considered patriotism, physical strength, 
chivalry and moral ideals of benevolence, modesty and heroism as ideal (Banerjee 
170). Social reformists and nationalists such as Swami Vivekananda and Bankim 
Chandra Chattopadhyay emphasized inverting the gendered colonial gaze. Moreover, 
these figures were significant for the development of Hindu nationalism as a 
masculinist or masculinizing movement.  
The conception of Hindu nationalism as a masculinist and “patriarchally” 
organized movement have given rise to questions of women’s conscious choice in 
participating in such a project. Hindu nationalism is perceived as a “religious 
fundamentalist” and right-wing movement, opposed to “secular” liberal feminist 
movements geared towards women’s emancipation, has especially made these 
questions potent. Women’s participation within a movement which emphasizes 
women’s roles as mothers, associated with domesticity and piety, has often been 
considered paradoxical. On the one hand, women appear to be “oppressed” under 
2 Sikhs, who Hindu nationalists consider as closely related to Hindus, were construed as a “martial race” who were 
physically and morally superior to Hindu men (Banerjee 170).  
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Hindu nationalist “patriarchy” while on the other, they are participants in a “public” 
political sphere. The perception of women’s political participation in a religious 
nationalist movement as paradoxical is based on binaries of private/public, 
religious/secular and the idea that women’s submission and oppression are relegated 
to the private sphere and perpetuated by the religious order.  
  The notion of women as passive objects of hegemony, or acting against their 
“own interests”, has been been rejected by a variety feminist scholars. However, 
these perceptions have often been applied by “Western” and/or liberal feminist 
scholars to women from postcolonial societies. Elaborating on the gendered colonial 
gaze which gave rise to narratives of “saving” Oriental women has especially 
problematized this application (Spivak; Abu Lughod). Moreover, Third World 
feminist scholars have emphasized the importance of recognizing the different 
contexts which give rise to gendered structures of power in the postcolonial world 
(Mohanty). These illustrate that male and female subjects, theories and practices of 
piety and family relationships might have significant differences in constitution in 
the postcolonial world.  
Moreover, Saba Mahmood points out that even studies of women which have 
dispelled conceptions of women as passive objects of hegemony while emphasizing 
them as active agents have continued to locate moments of resistance as expressions 
of agency. Mahmood argues that the binaristic opposition of freedom/resistance 
perpetuates the belief in a “nascent feminist consciousness” which imply that the 
desire to be free and resist hegemonic structures is natural. ​These invoke liberalist 
notions of individual autonomy which emphasise “one’s ‘true will’” and “self-directed 
action” or “‘real motivations’” (Mahmood 209).​ ​Drawing on the works of Michel 
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Foucault and Judith Butler, Mahmood emphasizes that concurring discourses of 
power shape individual desires and “agentival capacities”. Her research shows that 
both cultivation and resistance of a subjecthood is part of this paradigm of power.  
 
Women and Hindu Nationalism 
The aim of my project draws upon these theoretical frames to unpack the 
gendered character of Hindu nationalism and the diverse subject positions which are 
prescribed by male and female participants of the Sangh. More specifically, my 
project focuses on the intersection of female identity and the production of 
anti-Muslim ideology and practice within the Sangh. Following the work of 
postcolonial feminist scholars, I draw attention to British Orientalism, colonial 
processes of knowledge production, elite anti-colonial nationalist struggles and the 
ideological history of the Sangh Parivar to elaborate on the ways in which women 
have been central to the production of anti-Muslimness within Hindu nationalism. In 
what follows, I bring forth research by feminist scholars, ethnographic accounts and 
contemporary web-based Hindu nationalist popular media to unpack the 
relationship between women and Hindu nationalism.  
The statement by Sadhvi Prachi on reproduction and conversions provides an 
important framework for the questions I address in this project. In chapter 1, I 
unpack the theoretical underpinnings of “Love Jihad” and the significance of 
women’s bodies for maintaining Hindu numerical supremacy. Considering the 
production of classificatory data in the colonial census and its influence on electoral 
politics, as well as Orientalist stereotypes of Hindu/Muslim men, I will illustrate the 
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relationship of this concept to to previous anxieties surrounding Muslims which have 
involved on women’s bodies.  
In chapter 2, I look at Hindu nationalist women’s organizations and illustrate 
the significance of cultivating a nationalist motherhood which contributes to the 
production of Hindu nationalist subjects and sensibilities. Here, I will draw 
connections with the ideologies of womanhood and motherhood which developed in 
anti-colonial nationalist movements in the late 19th and early 20th century. 
Furthermore, I will draw attention to advocacy and recruitment efforts of these 
organizations which have involved historical and divine figures of Jijabai and Durga 
to construct the notion of ideal womanhood. These have placed importance on the 
development of a Hindu nationalist history of oppression and resistance which serve 
as a guide for women’s political actions.  
Lastly, in chapter 3, I will expand on the discussion of Hindu nationalist 
oppression to the production of nationalist affect and the mobilization of participants 
to perform acts of violence. I will focus on here on the speeches, performance and 
position of Sadhvi Rithambara, a female ascetic who was (in)famous for her role in 
the Ramjanmabhoomi movement which lead to the destruction of the Babri Masjid. 
Throughout the course of my project, I will also elaborate on themes of time, space, 
territory and national identity and their relationship with gender.  
 
I. Love Jihad: Preserving Women’s Bodies 
In August 2014, several BJP leaders and other members of the Sangh Parivar 
in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh rallied against Love Jihad, expressing their anger at an 
alleged case of rape, forced marriage of a 22 year old Hindu woman to a Muslim man 
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and her subsequent religious conversion. In September 2014, the 22 year old woman 
from Meerut who made the allegation revoked her complaint. In her statement, she 
explained: 
I was staying with my parents, but I ran away from home 
because I feel a threat to my life from my parents and 
relatives…I went with the boy belonging to a different 
community out of my own will.  
        (Qtd in “U-turn by Meerut girl on ‘love jihad’”) 
As in this case, police have found that alleged cases of Love Jihad have most often 
been consensual inter-faith relationships rather than evidence of a larger conspiracy 
of Muslim men seducing and forcefully converting Hindu women (ibid.; “‘Love jihad’ 
and religious conversion polarise in Modi’s India). In the above case, which gained 
significant visibility in a variety of media sources, the woman in question not only 
appears to have been pressured by her family but has also become an important 
figure for the Hindu nationalist campaign against Love Jihad. The idea of Love Jihad 
invokes questions about the relationship between families and the Sangh, religious 
conversions and women’s choices, especially in matters of love and marriage.  
A common thread through the discussions of Love Jihad is the image of 
secretive, disguised Muslim men, seducing and tricking Hindu women into loving 
and marrying them. Disguise and deceit not only imply women’s lack of choice in this 
scenario but also invoke a history of uncertainty about Muslim men’s actions and 
intentions. 
The Hindu nationalist campaign to protect women from deceptive Muslim 
men is part of a rhetoric of “saving women” which follows from Orientalist fantasies 
of colonial administrators saving women from native men, who were characterized as 
aggressive, hyper-oppressive, sexual predators (Spivak; Abu-Lughod). Moreover, 
Love Jihad points to the ways in which women’s romantic and sexual relations, 
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expressed across the divisions of politicized identity categories, threaten the 
perceived “purity” and cohesion of these divisions. Thus, the notion of protecting 
“our” women from “them” is an attempt at erasing the ambiguities of identities, of 
both, the Muslim “Other” and the Hindu self.  
The proposition to save Hindu women from Muslim men is intertwined with 
the significance placed on demographics in political participation and thus, from 
women’s reproductive capacities. In what will follow, I will illustrate the significance 
of the numerical imaginary in nationalist politics and its relationship with women’s 
bodies. This developed through the debates on widow remarriage in the mid-late 
colonial period, late colonial ​shuddhi ​and ​sangathan ​movements lead by the Arya 
Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha, and post-Partition, state initiated campaigns 
dealing with forced abductions. These cases illustrate two simultaneous concerns: 
first, for women’s welfare and protection, and second, for the preservation of identity 
categories through women’s bodies.  
In this chapter, I argue that Love Jihad is a novel iteration of existing anxieties 
surrounding identity, demographics and women’s bodies, infused with a rhetoric of 
saving women. I first illustrate the construction of supra-local ethnic identities of 
Hindu and Muslim and their relationship to the colonial census. Then I will discuss 
the significance of demographics in colonial and early postcolonial social reform 
campaigns. Lastly, I will unpack the claims of Love Jihad through analyzing posters 
which have been distributed in print and online. In this last section, I will delve into 
the use of the terms “Love" and “Jihad” to show the association of this campaign with 
the global "War on Terror”.  
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Identity and the Colonial Census  
Love Jihad’s claim over women’s sexuality and desire is intertwined with 
historical Hindu nationalist anxieties surrounding the population increase of 
Muslims. In 1909, Lt. Colonel U.N Mukerji released the pamphlet ​Hindus: The 
Dying Race ​and in 1924, the Arya Samaj missionary, Swami Shraddhanand’s ​ wrote 3
Hindu Sanghathan: Saviour of a Dying Race, ​as a response, after claiming to have 
studied statistics and the census for thirteen years. Thus, the idea of Hindus being a 
“dying race” amongst upper-class, upper-caste Hindus was influential in early Hindu 
nationalist movements (Sethi, 1547; Bhatt, 62). These anxieties draw attention to the 
ways in which “a numerical imagination” contributed to the development of 
naturalized group identity. These had direct implications for relationships which 
transgressed these identity boundaries as they were perceived as a threat to Hindu 
demographic supremacy. In this section, I will illustrate the ways in which the 
colonial census contributed to the construction of a racial identity categories and the 
consequences of demographic fears.  
The colonial census promoted a classificatory logic in order to govern and 
discipline native subjects. As Bernard Cohn has argued, data collection for the census 
was part of a process of “objectifying” the Indian populace. Gathering and classifying 
data on the population into categories was based upon preconceived theories of 
family, land, marriage and social groups such as religion, caste and class. Cohn 
explains that in the mid nineteenth century, British officials felt that “caste and 
religion were the sociological keys to understanding the Indian people” (242). Thus, 
the parameters of data collection for the census contributed to the classification of 
3 See Bhatt 62-75  
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the Indian population. Classificatory logic not only shaped conceptions of property 
and social relations but, for native subjects, also contributed to questions of identity, 
society and the development of an “Other” on the basis of caste and religion.  
This is not to suggest that the data collection for social stratification was novel 
to the British colonial state. As Arjun Appadurai has pointed out, Mughal rulers also 
had sophisticated means to count and control their subject population. Additionally, 
indigenous systems of classification, such as those based on caste, were prevalent 
before British imperialism. The census then must be understood as an interaction 
between “two theories of difference [which] share a critical assumption: that bodies 
of certain groups are the bearers of social difference and moral status” (Appadurai 
119). The production of numerical knowledge reformed and congealed existing social 
stratifications. Furthermore, the census conducted in British India was unique in 
that it was not only used to justify and control the Indian population but also to 
“argue and teach…bureaucratic discourse and practice” (119). The pedagogic nature 
of colonial systems of knowledge production is crucial to understanding the 
regulatory power of the postcolonial state.  
While the 1871 All-India census made data collection regarding peoples across 
the country its primary task, it was preceded by extensive research regarding land 
settlement, taxation and ecological variability. It is in this period that a numerical 
imaginary was established which contributed to the objectification of the native 
population (Cohn). According to Appadurai, this production of knowledge “unyoked 
social groups from the complex and localized group structures and agrarian practices 
in which they had previously been embedded” (“Modernity at Large”, 126). The latter 
half of the nineteenth century saw the enumeration and classification of people at the 
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village community level. The collection of data and its categorization was developed 
with the intention of creating a consistent system which could be applied to the 
all-India level (Cohn, 243).  
Social stratification and enumeration was seen as essential to understanding, 
accessing and governing the native population, seen as exotic. From 1870 to 1931, the 
All-India Census was an important source of quantitative information which 
influenced hypotheses regarding social practices as well as policy and reform efforts. 
“This concern with explaining and controlling exotic behaviors is a crucial piece of 
evidence that empiricism and exoticisation were not disconnected aspects of the 
colonial imaginary in India” (Appadurai, “Modernity at Large”, 128). Furthermore, 
the intricate struggles of data collection and the large amount of information lead to 
the privileging of “numerical majorities” (ibid.). While essentialism regarding social 
groups preceded the census, the enumeration of social groups solidified these 
previous stratifications and placed emphasis on an “idea of communities 
characterized by bioracial commonalities and bioracial differences” (ibid 130).  
The emphasis placed on numerical data and social hierarchies influenced 
Indian nationalism and continues to do so today. The concept of “majority” and 
“minority” groups inspired the structure of electoral politics which are focused on 
bloc voting. As Robert Frykenberg suggests:  
“for the Indian context, electoral politics became both a 
politics of ​representation ​(of the people to the people-a 
game of mirrors in which the state is made virtually 
invisible) and a politics of ​representativeness, ​that is , a 
politics of statistic, in which some bodies could be held to 
stand for other bodies because of the numerical principle 
of metonymy…”  
          (Qtd in Appadurai, “Modernity at Large”, 131)  
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Thus, the construction of all-India identity categories based on religious group can be 
seen as a result of the importance accorded to these social stratifications. Ayesha 
Jalal and Sugandha Bose have noted, “British social enumerators…invested the great 
religions of the subcontinent, Hinduism and Islam, with a degree of supra-local 
significance and cohesion never achieved before” (137).  Census based electoral 
politics influenced the construction of political parties which gained popularity on 
the basis of “ethnic” identity ​, such as the All-India Muslim League and the Hindu 
4
Mahasabha (All-India Hindu Assembly). The former used Muslim nationhood as a 
mobilizing strategy before the idea of a territorial, divided “Pakistan” had been 
conceived (153) while the latter advocated for the concept of a Hindu Rashtra much 
before ​Hindutva​ had been published by V.D Savarkar.  
 
Enumeration, Fertility and Masculinity  
Representation of native subjects in numerical form also inspired questions 
regarding social identity amongst Indian subjects. Appadurai notes that this 
contributed to social critique as well as activist movements of resistance where 
colonized subjects reconditioned colonial notions of “body, society, country and 
destiny” (133). However, Orientalist interpretations of the census which influenced 
data collection processes also authorized and elaborated tropes surrounding bioracial 
difference, fertility, reproduction and gender. For instance, the census report for the 
United Provinces ​ in 1911 claimed: “It has long been known that Musalmans are 
5
more fertile than Hindus and their chances of life are better: and the figures of the 
4Throughout this project, I follow Appadurai’s claim of Hindu and Muslim as ​ethnic ​identity categories: 
“the idea of a naturalized group identity” (“Modernity”, 7).  
5 The United Provinces of Agra and Oudh correspond approximately to the contemporary state of Uttar 
Pradesh (UP) 
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last decade merely strengthen this view…” (Qtd in Gupta, “Hindu wombs”, 178). 
Fears surrounding Muslim male fertility were explicitly constructed as a 
demographic contest within census reports. This can also be observed in the 1921 
census report which concluded: “Both relatively and absolutely Hindus have 
lost;…Hindus have decreased during the last decade by 347 per 10,000, or just under 
3.5 per cent” (ibid.).  
For elite Hindu reformers, demographic fears raised questions regarding 
group cohesion and were central to social reform movements such as ​shuddhi 
(literally: purity)​ ​and ​sangathan ​(consolidation)​. ​While these movements were 
directed at mitigating caste differences and consolidating a Hindu society, the goal of 
achieving purity was instrumental in fashioning a homogenous Hindu identity. These 
movements can be seen as antecedents to present day concerns surrounding 
women’s desire, sexuality and conversion as iterated in the Ghar​ ​Wapsi​ ​and Love 
Jihad movement. 
As discussed earlier, British ideals of Christian manliness constructed the 
colonized Hindu male subject as effeminate and lacking in moral and physical 
prowess. Moreover, as multiple postcolonial scholars have noted, colonial officials 
also painted the Muslim man as a hyper-patriarchal, sexual aggressor and sought to 
“save” oppressed colonial female subjects (Abu-Lughod; Spivak). These Orientalist 
fantasies, closely associated with demographics contributed to ideas of Hindu and 
Muslim masculinity in colonial India. Manisha Sethi explains that the perceived 
numerical and physical strength of Muslims became central to male Hindu anxieties: 
“the Muslim with his alleged ‘hyper fertility’ and ‘proclivity for violence’ came to 
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occupy the position of the predominant Other- more dangerous and hated than even 
the Britisher” (1547). 
Sexual and physical ​excess ​characterized Muslim men. The stereotype of the 
Muslim male as sexual predator was developed in tandem with the “mythology 
beginning from Alauddin Khilji ​…about the forceful abduction of Hindu women, 
6
their rape, pillage and conversion” (Sethi 1547). This makes clear that the threat of 
the Muslim Other has become central to Hindu nationalism’s historical narrative 
where “foreign invasion”, especially under what is characterized as “Muslim” rule is 
construed as a period in which Hindu women were abducted and raped. Thus, the 
census fueled anxieties surrounding Hindu male effeminacy and had significant 
sociopolitical consequences especially for unmarried and widowed women. 
  
Saving Hindu Women from Muslim Men  
 The significance placed on fertility also shaped the perception of women’s 
bodies as “vessels or reservoirs of future Hindu warriors” and on this account, 
women became central for preserving “the Hindu race” or in other words, 
maintaining a Hindu majority in India. The ​shuddhi ​movement of 1920 demonstrate 
the burgeoning significance of social difference as well as the collaboration between 
the family and state (Gupta, “Hindu women”). This is also evident in the debates 
surrounding the acceptance of widow remarriage. The relationship between identity 
and a concern for women’s wellbeing can also be observed in the post-Partition 
program to “restore” and “recover” women who were considered “abducted persons” 
by the Indian and Pakistani state (Das; Menon and Bhasin). These three moments 
6 Khilji was the second ruler of the Khilji dynasty in 11th and 12th centuries  
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draw attention to the ways in which enumeration, women’s reproductive capacities 
and identity have been instrumental in social reform movements in India. 
  
Widow Remarriage 
Widows in India, especially of upper-caste background, were most often not 
permitted to remarry and compelled to live as ascetics. Charu Gupta has argued that 
the debates about the treatment of widows in the United Provinces in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were influenced by an intersection of social 
reformist concerns and theories of Hindu/Muslim difference. While criticizing the 
exclusion and mistreatment of Hindu widows, much of the writing by Hindu 
publicists ​ rested on the assumption that widows were “by nature” lustful and 
7
Muslim men were “by nature” sexual predators (Gupta, “Hindu wombs”, 183).  
Since widows were located outside of the domestic sphere, their sexuality and 
reproductive capacities were considered threatening. Unlike the unmarried woman 
whose chastity could be controlled, the widow who lacked “‘legitimate’ access to sex”  
8
was considered dangerous for maintaining the family (ibid. 172-73). The prevalence 
of this theory made asceticism the most ideal mode of being. This not only meant 
that widows were to abstain from social relations with other men but also that they 
were barred from any form of ​sringar ​ ​and could not eat hot foods or betel which 9
7 Gupta defines ​“​Hindu publicists ​” ​as ​“​those who used printed pamphlets and the public media 
consciously or unconsciously to promulgate a particular ​‘​Hindu ​’ ​point of view, and through their 
speeches, meetings and writings, asserted community differences and communal antagonisms. Many of 
them were influenced by or were members of the Arya Samaj, but they also included some Sanatan 
Dharmists, Hindu Mahasabha activists, Hindi literati, Congress members and leaders of various caste 
associations ​” ​(“Hindu wombs”, 167) Thus, her work displaces the notion that early Hindu nationalist 
opinions were a minority opinion at the margins. 
8 The belief that the sexual desire of widows was to be regulated was based on the concept that “women 
had eight times the sexual urge of men, and that it was extremely difficult to control” (Gupta, “Hindu 
wombs”, 173)  
9 Widows were prohibited from “apply[ing] perfume or adorn[ing] [themself] with flowers….The use of 
mehndi (henna), ​jewelry…and ​ ​kajal ​(lamoblack)” ​(ibid.) 
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would inspire sexual urges. Disciplining and regulating the behavior of widows was 
considered important because it was believed that widows’ unfulfilled sexual desires 
“lead to abortion, infanticide and prostitution” (ibid. 176). The lustful nature of the 
widow was made more dangerous when considered together with the perceived 
hyper fertility and hyper sexuality of Muslim men. This rested on the belief that 
widows would be easily seduced, allowing Muslim men to seduce and consequently, 
convert them.  
Census reports which explicitly pointed to the decline of the Hindus were 
essential in the producing the belief that Hindu women’s wombs needed to be 
preserved and protected from Muslim men. The census report from 1911 cited earlier 
makes this evident: 
‘The prohibition of the remarriage of widows does not 
effect the Muhammadan. The figures bear this out…The 
Muhammadan widows are only 14 per cent of the female 
population as against 17 per cent among Hindus…At the 
child-bearing ages (15-40), when this factor will chiefly 
effect the rate of increase, under 3 per cent of 
Muhammadan women are widows whilst the Hindu rate 
is over 4 per cent’          (Qtd in Gupta 178) 
The above passage forges a clear association between census figures, differences 
between Hindu and Muslim widows, and an emphasis on their reproductive 
capacities through comparing the percentage of widows based on “child-bearing 
ages”.  
Advocates of widow remarriage also argued on the basis of humanitarian 
concern for the treatment of widows but most often, these were mobilized to explain 
the appeal of marrying Muslim men. Consider the poem below written by the Hindu 
poet Ayodhyasingh Upadhyay:  
‘Gode mein isaiyat islam ki 
betiyan bahuein lita car hum late! 
ah ghate par humen ghata hua  
 
22 
man bewail ka ghata jar hum ghate!!’ 
(In the lap of Christianity and Islam/we have lain our 
daughters and daughters-in-law!/we have suffered loss 
after loss/in treating them as less we have become lesser 
in number!!)  
(Qtd in Gupta, 182; translation mine) 
The claim “by not respecting widows, we have dwindled in numbers” establishes a 
causal relationship between the treatment of widows and the demographic threat of 
the Other. In other words, a concern for the welfare of widows was most often placed 
amongst fears of the Other gaining numerical supremacy. Another pamphlet cited a 
remarried widow, Gulab Devi, who cautioned that preserving Hindu society required 
a regulation of widows: 
‘Find some way to protect the reproductive and 
mothering capacity of Hindu community Otherwise these 
devis ​(goddesses) of yours, who produced Ram, Krishna, 
Bhim, Arjun and Harishchandra ​ will produce 
10
Khudabaksh, Rahimbaksh and Karimbaksh. They will get 
cows slaughtered and temples destroyed. Then the 
identity of this Hindu community, which could not be 
wiped out even by tanks and swords, would vanish in thin 
air’          (Qtd. in Gupta 187) 
This quote not only re-emphasises the relationship between widow’s reproductive 
capacities and a numerical preservation of Hindu society but makes evident the 
significance of women for the preservation of the Hindu identity. Even though the 
threat here is primarily a widow’s ability to produce Muslim children, the “mothering 
capacity” alludes the an elision of cultivating Hindu patriotic-piety in children and 
instead promoting aspects of Muslim identity which threaten Hindu ideological 
supremacy.  
Writings on mistreatment of widows evokes sympathy and draws attention to 
widows’ vulnerability to Muslim men which emphasizes their need for protection. 
10  
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These assumptions were furbished with publications by organizations and popular 
magazines which sought to illustrate the plight of Hindu widows who were compelled 
to marry across ethnic divisions. Gupta points to the writing of the teacher and 
author of children’s books, Zahur Bakhs, who often wrote pieces for ​Chand, ​a Hindi 
magazine prominent in UP, in the early 1920s. Assuming the voice of a widow, his 
pieces titled “Main Mussalman Kaise Hui” (How I Became a Muslim) or “Main Isai 
Kaise Hui” (How I became a Christian) blamed both Hindu society for oppressing 
widows while also arguing that ethnic Others had exploited widows’ vulnerability 
(Gupta, “Hindu wombs” 184-5). Similarly, a three part series by the Vidhwa Sahayak 
Karyalaya (Office to Help Widows) of Agra also included writing in the voice of 
widows as well as personal accounts with titles such as “Rampyari urf Shirdara 
Begum” ​, “How I became Fatima from Champa”, “Shahzadiya Devi, Who was Rakko 
11
before”. These stories also included pictures where in “on one side was depicted the 
Hindu widow in ‘Hindu clothes’, and on the other was the same woman as a married 
Muslim in ‘Muslim attire’”. These stories portrayed widows as victims who, once 
converted, felt further oppressed by Muslim family and society. Nevertheless, the 
emotional appeal of these publications was that they assumed the voice of a widow. 
Gupta also cites another passage where the Hindu widow inverts the sentiment 
expressed by Gulab Devi, framing it directly as a threat to Hindu men. The last 
segment of the series included stories of Arya Samaj activists who had “saved” them 
from Muslim men and housed them at the Kashi Vidhwa Home (Widows’ Home).  
The shift towards the legalization of widow remarriage suggests the interplay 
of three factors: the mistreatment of widows in Hindu society, the perceived threat of 
11  
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Muslim demographical ascendancy and Orientalist stereotypes regarding the sexual 
aggressiveness of Muslim men. The analysis of popular publications also draws 
attention to a rhetoric of women’s vulnerability and victimhood which inspired 
Hindu reformers to save widows from Muslim men. These publications illustrate that 
(male) Hindu reformers not only presumed that Hindu widows were in a state of 
false consciousness but also literally assumed Hindu widows’ voices. This achieved 
two important ends. First, the narrative style inspired Hindu men to think of saving 
widows as their duty. Additionally, the dramatic and personal nature of the titles also 
sought to paint Hindu widows as desirable and erotic. Thus, the discussion 
surrounding widow remarriage can be seen as not only a reclamation of Hindu 
wombs but also of Hindu women’s sexuality. 
  
Partitioned States and “Abducted” Women  
Love and sexuality expressed across the divisions of politicized identity 
categories threaten the perceived purity and cohesion of these divisions. While the 
legalization of widow remarriage and the ​shuddhi ​movement illustrate the threat of 
Muslim contamination in Hindu society, anxieties surrounding women’s 
reproductive capacities and the limits of enumerated identity categories has also 
been expressed in the postcolonial era by modern (secular) states. The discussion of 
the women after the Partition of India and creation of Pakistan who were legally 
defined as “abducted persons” points to how women specifically complicated 
categories of Hindu or Sikh/Muslim as well as Indian/Pakistani (Das; Menon & 
Bhasin).  
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During the mass exodus of populations in India and Pakistan, multiple cases 
of rape, abduction and forced marriages of women were reported. After the Partition, 
India and Pakistan established a program to “return” women to their respective 
families which in India was known as the “Abducted Persons (Restoration and 
Recovery) Act of 1949”. Veena Das has argued that the state response to the violence 
women faced minimized women’s needs and desires and instead was an exercise in 
restoring national honor and asserting a liberal modernity through claiming regard 
for women’s rights. Ritu Menon & Kamla Bhasin have also pointed out that an 
emphasis on national honor was central to the establishment of this program.  
Das further explains that the program points to a collaboration of the family 
and the state, where the honor of both was prioritized over women’s choice and 
consent. Moreover, she points out that “the honor of the nation was at stake because 
women as a sexual and reproductive beings were forcibly held by the other side” (Das 
68). As in the case on widow remarriage and the ​shuddhi ​movement, the emphasis 
on reproductive capacities is evident here as well. Das points out that in some 
discussions of the Act, both India and Pakistan sought to restore women in equal 
numbers and of a suitable age where their reproductive capacities could be 
capitalized on.  
Das problematizes the concept of “abducted persons” by drawing attention to 
multiple cases where women were forcefully returned to their families and their own 
choice in the matter was not taken into consideration (71). Thus she claims that the 
discourse of the state coercively produced victims. While social workers who worked 
with women cited instances of women’s desires to not return to their old families, 
like the state, they presumed that the women were “under a state of false 
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consciousness regarding their consent in marriages” (Das 73).  These coercive 
methods of responding to violence illustrate the ability of the state to: 
“put upon [a woman] an obligation to ​remember ​ that her 
abductor, to whom she is now married, is the murderer of 
her husband or her father. The women themselves are 
therefore caught in an impossible situation, where an 
obligation to maintain a narrative continuity with the past 
contradicts their ability to live in the present”  
            (Das, 73; emphasis in original)  
This illustrates the ways in which the state delegitimized narratives and memory of 
violence in its attempt to embed the violence committed against her in a narrative of 
violence committed against her large-scale community. In silencing women’s chosen 
responses to violence, women were instantly perceived to belong to fixed categories 
of Hindu/Sikh or Muslim. The liminal position of these women appears to have 
raised anxieties surrounding the boundaries of newly territorialized, national identity 
categories of India and Pakistan. The ambiguous nature of the women’s identities can 
be understood as a threat to the burgeoning national identity which had recently 
been physically demarcated.  
Responses of elite reformers and the state to the mistreatment of widows and 
violence against women following the Partition draw attention to theories of 
protectionism which reflect their gendered nature. Moreover, the development of 
enumerated ethnic identities and anxieties surrounding demographics also show that 
these concerns are intermingled with aspirations to preserve “wombs” which have 
been attached to naturalizing ethnic and national identities.  
Producing the threat of Love Jihad 
 
Discussions of Love Jihad have gained considerable visibility in Indian and 
international print and online media sources, sparking debates surrounding 
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romantic intimacy, choice, marriage, patriarchal family structures and public 
displays of affection. Hindu nationalist advocates of the concept of Love Jihad have 
used multiple poster images which have been popular on blogs and Facebook pages. 
The availability of these posters online and the use of image-editing software draws 
attention to the ways in which the internet has influenced the images included on 
posters and their availability.  
The fear of forced religious conversion by Muslim men in disguise which is at 
the heart of this campaign resonates with the public notices which were disseminated 
during the 1920 ​shuddhi ​movement. Posters from the ​shuddhi ​movement addressed 
men, cautioning them to monitor women’s movements to protect them from Muslim 
men (Gupta, “Love Jihad”, 14). Contemporary Love Jihad posters propagate similar 
ideas regarding the vulnerability of Hindu women and the perceived threat of 
Muslim men. Blogs with these posters have also included detailed instruction on how 
parents may monitor unmarried women’s activities, including movement, phone and 
internet use. In this section, I will unpack the ways in which these posters exacerbate 
stereotypes regarding the threat of Muslim men.  
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Consider the poster above released by a militant hindu nationalist 
sub-organisation comprised of young men, Shree Rama Sena (“the Army of Lord 
Rama”). The poster claims that the forced conversion of Hindu women is a part of 
the “perverse love rackets of venomous fanatic animals” (Figure 1). This reference to 
“animals” here is accompanied with the inclusion of a minotaur like creature, 
half-animal, with horns, red eyes, sharp fangs and half-human, with a stylized beard, 
and arms, with fur and/or in gloves, reaching out below to the figure of a woman yet 
facing the audience. The portrayal of the Muslim Other as a morphed, monstrous 
creature alludes to a grotesque, unnatural nature, evoking feelings of horror and 
uncertainty. These conceptions reestablish Orientalist images of Muslim Others, as 
wild, dangerous and predatorial, propagated by colonial administrators as well as 
Hindu social reformists in colonial India. This imagery and the inclusion of terms 
such as “perverse”, “venomous” and “fanatic” also resonate with contemporary 
conceptions of “terrorist-monster” which rest on notions of sexual deviancy which 
must be disciplined (Puar and Rai 117).  
 
29 
 
Moreover, figure 1 and 2 both illustrate conversion by presenting the figure of a 
woman with Hindu and Muslim identity markers. In figure 1, the woman on the one 
side is clad in a sari and wearing a bindi, while on the other side is wearing a black 
niqab​. The dividing line on the woman’s body appears to be in itself an attempt to 
erase the ambiguity of her identity through visible cultural markers. Here, the 
ambiguity of the monstrous, minotaur-like creature appears in contrast to the 
certainty of the woman’s bifurcated identity. The fact that the bindi, traditionally, is 
associated with Hindu marriages also alludes to the woman’s marriageability. 
Similarly, in figure 2, a woman face appears in an image-edited niqab, her eyes 
behind prison bars and her bindi, here being a marker for her Hindu identity, is 
bleeding. Again, the bindi and the veil function as physical markers, marking ethnic 
identity on women’s bodies.  
The inclusion of the English term “spoil” ​ here alludes to the (virgin) purity of 
12
the Hindu woman which has been violated through trickery. Unlike figure 1, the 
woman in figure 2 appears to literally be confined behind prison bars, suggesting that 
this is a Hindu woman “trapped” in the life of a Muslim woman. In this narrative, 
12 Interestingly, none of the marathi terms mentioned above the English ones translate to ​“​spoil ​”​. The 
term above spoil, ​faswanook, ​can mean fraud, trickery or deception 
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unmarried Hindu women are faultless, retaining their moral purity. It is in fact their 
naïveté which causes them to be vulnerable of the “trap of Love Jihad” (Figure 2). 
The vulnerability and purity of Hindu women legitimizes the savior rhetoric that is 
evident in these posters. 
The mention of a “love racket” in the poster also de-emphasises the legitimacy 
of consensual intimacy between Hindu women and Muslim men. These are also 
evident in Figure 2 where words such as “love” and “deceit” encourage the perception 
that women are being converted and married against their will. Similar to the social 
workers after the Partition who attributed women’s resistance to being “recovered” 
or “returned” as “false consciousness” (Das 72), and the Orientalist fantasies 
described above and evident in debates on widow remarriage, Love Jihad assumes 
that Hindu women would not consensually marry Muslim men and must be 
“protected” or “saved”.  
Recall here that the underlying narrative by Hindu nationalist groups has 
been that Muslim men disguised as Hindu men are forcefully converting Hindu 
women under the false pretense of love. The conception of Muslim men being 
“disguised” alludes again to their perceived mysterious, suspicious nature. This again 
draws attention to an uncertainty of identity categories which are at the heart of 
violence against ethnic Others (Appadurai, “Dead Certainty”). Again, through 
wearing physical markers such as wearing a ​tilaka ​(powder marking) on the forehead 
or a ​kalava ​(sacred thread) on the wrist, Muslim men are able to appear Hindu, 
physically marked as “one of us”. Thus, it is a transgression of the naturalized, 
demographic identity boundaries which again arouses the question: “how many of 
‘them’ are now among ‘us’” (ibid. 228-9).  In this regard, Muslim men’s bodies, 
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through appearing Hindu, encapsulate an ambiguity which stands in opposition to 
the pure, marriageable body of the Hindu woman who appears in these posters 
(Figures 1 and 2).  
Love, Family and the Sangh 
In both these posters, the notion of love seems to be consistently evoked as a 
parallel to deception. Both posters include direct transliteration of Love Jihad as well 
as ​prem ​ (love; Figure 2) and ​premjaal ​(love trap, here translated as “love racket”; 
Figure 1). To understand the invocation of the English term love here, it is important 
first to place this concept within the Indian social and legal norms surrounding 
romantic intimacy, marriage and family. Marriages where two individuals have 
chosen their partner are commonly referred to as “love-marriage”, in contrast to 
“arranged-marriage” where the family has sought a partner for their child, usually of 
the same class, caste and religious background. The assumption of pre-marital 
romantic intimacy is not the norm (Mody 333) ​. 
13
In social and legal terms, the family plays a central role in romantic 
relationships and marriage in India. In ​Marriage and Modernity, ​Rochona 
Majumdar has noted that the development of arranged marriages in India is related 
to the emergence of the “joint family” ​ and the “marriage market” ​ in late colonial 
14 15
13 Perveez Mody explains: ​“​Marriage, then, is not concerned with whether or not the couple are ​‘​in love ​’ ​- 
in fact, in the case of Hindus, it is geared around the assumption that ideally the girl and the boy are 
strangers to each other and that it is their obligation to their parents that makes them sometimes 
reluctant, though consenting, parties to the marriage ​…​Hence, the construction of the relationship 
between love and marriage is that love should never precede marriage; but equally, marriage does not 
preclude the possibility of a loving and intimate relationship ​” ​(333) 
14 Majumdar defines “joint family” as “several ‘households’ (what scholars would call an ‘elementary’ 
family, complete or incomplete) either actually living together under the same roof or sharing the idea of 
the joint family as a normative ideal” (4) 
15 The concept of the “marriage market” is central to Majumdar’s study of marriage in late colonial 
Bengal. She argues that conceptions of “arrangement” had their basis in market related developments 
and were distinctly modern, she says: “The practice is not without a past, but I call it modern because its 
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Bengal. Struggles surrounding conceptions of family, individual freedoms, choice 
and agency have featured prominently in social, legal and pop-cultural discourse. In 
her ethnography on love marriages in Delhi, Perveez Mody has pointed to the violent 
struggles between families and individuals, whereby several elopements were legally 
registered as kidnappings or abductions. These are especially common in cases of 
romantic intimacy which occur across community boundaries and are seen as a 
threat to family honor.  
The discussion surrounding Love Jihad draws attention not only to Hindu 
nationalist organizations but also to the complex, contested conceptions of family, 
agency and marriage. The use of the term “love” in Love Jihad carries the weight of 
love-marriages and elopements which are viewed as transgressions, especially when 
occurring across ethnic boundaries. Recall here the August 2014 case in Meerut with 
which I started this chapter where, in a later statement, the woman made explicit 
that she was threatened by her parents. She also claimed that she had approached 
the police seeking temporary housing due to this threat. From this perspective, Love 
Jihad can also be understood as a collaboration between the family and the Sangh 
which seeks to delegitimize individual desires . In this sense, Love Jihad is similar to 16
the post-Partition campaigns which also functioned on the basis of a relationship 
between national and family honor (Das). 
performance from the late nineteenth century involves the use of institutions and ideas central to any 
understanding of modernity: urban life, Western education, the print media (the publication of 
matrimonial advertisements seeking brides and grooms), monetisation of relationships (the escalation in 
the practice of dowry), cultivation of distinction and cultural capital (debates about what constitutes a 
tasteful wedding), and law (certain legal reforms to do with property and ideas of rights and 
personhood).” (2) 
16 I do not intend to suggest that this choice or desire arise from a “free will” but recognise taht these are 
constituted by existing hegemonic regimes.  
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This is also evident in a statement released by Hindu nationalist organizations 
at a press conference in Mumbai in September 2014. In a press notice, the 
organizations demanded legislation to prevent Love Jihad:  
In order to prevent any danger to the unity and integrity 
of the Nation, a stringent law should be enacted in the 
country against deceit and atrocities committed on the 
women. This Act should make provision for awarding 
stringent punishment to the accused from the Muslim 
community on the basis of the statements given by the 
girls (an[d] their relatives) from a non-Muslim 
communities like Hindu, Jain, Sikhs, Christian, Buddhist, 
etc. 
(Hindu Janajagruti Samiti 2014)  
This statement calls for the preservation of national unity and utilizes the rhetoric of 
protecting women “against deceit and atrocities”.  Furthermore, it mentions the 
importance of statements from a woman’s relatives. In several of the “exposés” 
conducted by popular media sources, statements from family and relatives have also 
been included as evidence of Love Jihad. Significantly, the above statement also 
draws attention to a unique collaboration between ethnic communities uniting 
against Muslim communities.  
 
Past violence/Future threat 
Central to Hindu nationalist ideology has been the construction of narrative of 
historical victimhood of Hindus, oppressed under Mughal and British colonial rule. 
Thus, Hindu nationalist ideology perpetuates itself through producing a narrative 
continuity between the Mughal era and contemporary Indian Muslims, and British 
colonialism and contemporary Indian Christians. The image of Muslim men as 
sexual predators has also been maintained on the construction of the Mughal era as a 
time period where Hindu women were sexually assaulted by Muslim men. The 
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narrative continuity between past Hindu oppression under Mughal rule and the 
future threat of Muslim demographic ascendancy through Love Jihad is captured in 
this poster (Figure 3): 
 
The jagged line in the above poster delineates past violence, appearing in gray, 
from contemporary threat, appearing in purple (figure 3). The uncertainty of the 
future is established through asking the viewer: “Today with a rose? Tomorrow…” in 
red. The cancellation on the term “Love”, amongst the terms “conversion”, “rape”, 
“kidnap” and “murder” alludes to the false nature of love. On the left side of the 
image, the hanging statement “Then by force…” appears above a cartoon figure 
symbolizing Mughal men, blending into the gray background of the past. Wearing a 
turban, the figure has chiseled features, is bearded and frowning deeply, connoting 
the aggression, (hyper)masculinity and strength of Mughal men.  
An explicit connection to the Mughal era is made in the statement: “The 
mughals would loot and rape Indian women…”. Here, the category of “Indian 
women” is projected onto a Mughal past for the construction of a future threat. The 
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relationship between love and threat is also evident in the use of the color red, in 
contrast with the color green, the traditional color of Islam and also the color of the 
Mughal flag, which appears on the words “Jihad”, on the claim regarding Mughal 
violence and as a glow on the word “conversions”. The color scheme also appears to 
contribute to a narrative continuity between the violences of the past and the threat 
of deception in the present.  
“Jihad” 
The above poster makes evident the connection being established between 
Love Jihad as a contemporary threat and the past dishonor on women’s bodies which 
must be “avenged” (Sethi). For one, these narratives appear to be associated with and 
exacerbated by Orientalist stereotypes regarding Muslims. The term “Jihad” in Love 
Jihad also co-opts the discourse of the global “War on Terror” which has made terms 
such as “Jihad” common parlance, associated with stereotypes regarding violent 
Muslim men. The invocation of the Mughal era, then, also functions as evidence of 
Muslim “backwardness”. Thus, the concept of Love Jihad complicates the normative 
schism of established in the "clash of civilizations” hypothesis between a secular, 
advanced West and a backward religious non-West which needs disciplining. The 
importance of anti-terrorist rhetoric for Hindu nationalism further illustrates the 
existence of a transnational network facing a perceived Islamic terrorist threat which 
must be curtailed.  
Hindu Men Saving Muslim Women 
Burgeoning discourse on women’s rights in Muslim majority countries and 
amongst Muslim minority communities in the West has also been central for the 
production of Love Jihad ideology. For instance, the blog ​“Struggle for Hindu 
 
36 
existence” ​ edited by a prominent Hindu nationalist figure,  Upananda Brahmachari, 
and the Facebook page, “Save Mother Land of Hindus is Hindustan” also disseminate 
news stories regarding violence against women in the Middle East or in Pakistan. For 
example, consider the poster below from the facebook page (Figure 4):  
The poster uses images from contemporary issues around the world to propagate the 
belief that Muslim women are significantly more oppressed than Hindu women with 
the claim “How Islam spoils the life of Muslim women”. Here again, the category of 
“Muslim women” appears naturalized and eternal, as if bearing no relationship with 
“Islam”. In the poster, six factors are presented: the burqa, marriage to older men, 
lack of education, suicide bombing, polygamy, verbal divorce and Shariah law. These 
are accompanied with images from around the world: of women wearing blue burqas 
(most popular in Central Asia and Afghanistan, and required by the Taliban), a newly 
married couple, the Pakistani activist, Malala Yousafzai, a potential female suicide 
bomber, a Muslim family and an image of an acid attack survivor. These six points 
and the accompanying images take for granted that women are adversely affected 
due to these factors and that all of these activities are solely associated with Islam. 
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The format of the poster, with few words and multiple images, appears to be in 
accordance with the format of most internet memes.  
The transnational circulation of images and news surrounding “terrorism”, 
“jihad” and “women’s rights” exacerbate pre-existing perceptions of Muslim women 
as particularly oppressed due to Islam. Hindu nationalist groups have consistently 
claimed that Hindu religion and society respects and reveres women (Basu 171). 
Central to this proposition is the notion of ​nari shakti ​(women’s power) and the 
power and strength accorded to mother figures which has been central to the 
development of nationalism in India. It is from this position that Hindu nationalist 
organizations has developed their position against personal laws , which are a 1718
central feature of Indian secularism and family law. For instance, the prominent 
Sadhvi, Uma Bharati argued against personal laws claiming: “‘I feel for my Muslim 
sisters…but they do not seem to feel for themselves. How can they agree to wear the 
burqa? ​How can they abide by Muslim law” (Basu 171). The BJP has also often 
characterized the Indian National Congress (henceforth referred to as the Congress) 
as “pseudo-secularist” due to the latter’s reluctance to expand the Uniform Civil Code 
to family laws. Thee debates shed light on contested terrains between religion, family 
and the state. Moreover, similar to the colonial state and the post-Partition campaign 
17 “India has a dual law structure: uniform criminal and civil laws, but separate personal laws for 
different religious communities. The Indian Constitution approves a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) 
applicable to all citizens irrespective of their religion, but it exists at present only as a Directive Principle. 
Personal law, since it is envisaged as a means of securing community identity and respecting religious 
difference, operates therefore within rather than despite a constitutional commitment to secularism” 
(Needham and Rajan, 29)  
18  Rochona Majumdar also notes that the concept of “personal law” is intertwined with the separation of 
the family and state which was central to the advent of British colonial rule in India (4). 
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to recover abducted women, Hindu nationalists assert their modernity though 
participating in the globalized campaign to “save Muslim women”  19
 
II: Nationalist Motherhood: Reproducing the Hindu Nation 
Beliefs surrounding women’s oppression and a need to formulate an 
organization dedicated to developing women’s self-defense and emphasizing ​nari 
shakti ​(women’s power) were central motivations for Laxmibai Kelkar, the founder of 
the Samiti. While there are multiple stories regarding the inspiration for the 
organization, most scholars cite an incident where Kelkar notices that a woman is 
sexually harassed and her husband and passers-by are bystanders (Bacchetta 
“Ideologues”, 131). This incident spurs her inspiration for joining the RSS, an 
organization which emphasizes discipline, self-defense and community. The Samiti 
was formed after Kelkar proposed this idea to the first sarsanghachalak of the RSS, 
Dr. Keshav Baliram Hedgevar and she founded the Samiti in 1936.  
Organizations within the Sangh Parivar conceive of motherhood as the 
primary mode of political participation for women. The importance accorded to 
motherhood is intertwined with the belief that women are custodians of culture, 
tradition and spirituality, which developed in anti-colonial, nationalist movements of 
the 19th and 20th century. Women’s organizations, especially, are central in 
19  One instance of these debates was evident in the highly controversial ten year Supreme Court case 
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum ​regarding the right to alimony. Zakaria Pathak and Rajeswari 
S. Rajan have argued that the discourses surrounding the case saw the displacement of the woman, Shah 
Bano, and instead brought to the forefront debates between politicized Hindu and Muslim activists and 
the law regarding women, family, secularism and Indian law. The scholars have argued that narratives of 
protecting Muslim women were central to Hindu nationalists and the government. Thus, the concern for 
Muslim women expressed by Hindu nationalist groups can be translated as “Hindu men are saving 
Muslim women from Muslim men” analogous to Gayatri Spivak’s phrase “white men are saving brown 
women from brown men”(263).  
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developing the concept of ​nationalist motherhood, ​which is seen as a defining 
feature of Hindu culture and Bharat, as the ideal nation. Ideal nationalist mothers 
are viewed as compassionate teachers, essential for the development of ​samskaras, 
or “cultural values”, in their children. In this sense, samskaras involve the cultivation 
of patriotic/piety, which not only implies developing Hindu piety but also involves 
imbuing a reverence for Bharat and for the Sangh ​ ​Parivar​ ​in children. Thus, within 
Hindu nationalist ideology, women are considered responsible for not only the literal 
but also the ideological reproduction of the Hindu nation.  
While in the previous chapter I discussed the importance accorded to women’s 
bodies and reproductive capacities by Hindu nationalist groups, I wish to further 
elaborate on this claim further by drawing attention to feminine subjecthood as 
imagined by women’s organizations. In this chapter, I will discuss the development 
of nationalist motherhood as a crucial position for female Hindu nationalist subjects. 
Historical and goddess figures such as Jijabai and Durga are instrumentalized in the 
discourse to inspire women to not only be compassionate and benevolent mothers 
but also tactical activists, dedicated to the nation. Thus, in relation to their male 
counterparts, Hindu nationalist women’s organizations reproduce, resist and 
reconfigure various conceptions of female identity, agency and history. In this 
chapter, I focus on the evocation of the Jijabai and Durga in recruitment and 
advocacy efforts of women’s organizations to understand the ways in which 
nationalist motherhood serves as the ideal subject position for women within the 
movement.  
Women and Indian Nationalism 
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In the previous chapter, discussing the relationship between demographics, 
women’s bodies and reproductive capacities, I pointed to an emphasis on women’s 
association with nature. However, women have also been seen as symbols of culture, 
tradition and spirituality in colonial and postcolonial India ​. British colonial systems 
20
of power influenced concepts of femininity and masculinity and contributed to a 
reconstitution of gender relations and hierarchies. This is not to suggest that 
hierarchical gender relations did not precede British colonialism but instead to show 
that burgeoning ideologies of anti-colonial nationalism appropriated and 
reconstituted categories of feminine and masculine. The construction of womanhood 
in this period, as well as ideologies of motherhood, were crucial in the formation of 
independent India. 
Drawing attention to debates on the “women’s question” amongst elite social 
reformers, Partha Chatterjee has argued that late nineteenth century nationalism 
construed the feminine, and women, as symbolic of culture and tradition. Indian 
nationalists sought to preserve the traditions, indigenous culture and spirituality of 
the country—the “inner” sphere—while mastering the material or “outer” sphere, 
(associated with science, governance, education etc.) which had made Western 
civilization capable of becoming powerful colonizers around the world. The 
inner/outer dichotomy rested on the assumption that the East was spiritually 
superior, and that the inner, domestic, feminine realm was unchanged by the effects 
20 . This complicates Sherry Ortner​’​s argument of women as associated with nature and men as 
associated with culture. Ortner​ ​argues that there exists a universal binary of female as close to nature, 
male as close to culture. Within this conception,  women​’​s association with motherhood and domesticity 
limits their agency through restricting their access to the public sphere, and in turn, their participation in 
politics and wage labor. Several marxist and socialist feminist theorists have argued against a binary 
between public and private which devalues women​’​s labor within the household and depoliticizes the 
private sphere (Hartmann). Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood have also argued against a division of 
public/private in relation to the development of Western secularism.  
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of colonialism. These conceptions influenced the construction of femininity and 
women’s roles in Indian society. For instance, even while social reformists argued to 
permit women’s education and the “cultural refinement” of women, the 
westernization of women was perceived as a threat to the “essential nature” of the 
country. Chatterjee points out that the primary duty of the educated “new woman” 
was the maintenance of traditional family life and the preservation the sanctity of 
spiritual culture (254-255). Thus, for elite nationalist social reformers, women were 
symbolic of the “essential culture” of the country, its traditions and spirituality, 
which had remained unchanged by British colonizers. From this perspective, the 
subjugation of the nation, culture and traditions materialized in the figure of the 
suffering Indian woman. 
Bengali Motherhood  
Within this construction of womanhood, the figure of the Bengali mother also 
gained an important status, becoming a symbol of the indigeneity of native subjects. 
Jasodhara Bagchi’s analysis of the hagiographies and writings of elite social 
reformers and intellectuals such as Michael Madhusudan Dutt, Vidyasagar, 
Ramakrishna Paramahansa, Swami Vivekananda, Anurupa Devi, Mahasweta Devi 
has drawn attention to the exalted status of their mothers. As women, mothers 
served to emphasize the individuality, cultural superiority and uniqueness of 
colonized subjects which was threatened under colonial rule. Thus, the figure of the 
Bengali mother was developed as ever giving, compassionate and kind-hearted as 
well as suffering and self-sacrificing. Moreover, the romanticization of motherhood 
was also related to the feminization of male colonial subjects by colonizers:  
As the stable centre of a fragile colonial society, she 
provide[d] constant solace to the humiliated son; on 
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occasion her heroism act[ed] as…inspiration to lift up the 
downtrodden spirit of the son            (Bagchi 66) 
Thus, women as mothers were prominent in the nationalist project, serving as 
symbols of indigeneity while caring and providing for their sons, who were 
considered the principal nationalist subjects. Bagchi has argued that the elevated 
status of benevolent, sacrificing mothers made it “the ‘ultimate identity’ of Bengali 
women” and in turn, facilitated women’s economic deprivation (66).  
Nationalist conceptions of motherhood also relied on the prevalence of 
goddess worship in Bengal and influenced both, mothers and goddesses. For 
instance, in Bengal, the goddess Shakti, in the form of Chandi, Kali or Durga, was a 
prominent goddess. Thus, nationalist motherhood developed as a combination of the 
affectionate Bengali mother figure as well as the fierce elements of Durga. Mother 
goddess figures served to “hinduise the tone of nationalism in Bengal” while imbuing 
motherhood with sacrosanct qualities (Bagchi 66). At the same time, the image of 
Durga as powerful and angry was also domesticated to fit within the nationalist 
imagination of motherhood. Anja Kovacs describes images of Durga for Bengali 
nationalists which portrayed her as “an ideal mother figure; ‘the presiding deity of 
Bengali kitchens and the sickbed’” (375). Thus, for the nationalist project, female 
identity was desexualized in the form of mother and goddess figures, emphasizing 
the purity of women, and in turn, of the nation. Moreover, mothers in the national 
imaginary were characterized as affectionate, benevolent, sacrificing and suffering as 
well as consoling, encouraging and, in times of crises, heroic. 
Bharat Mata  
The relationship between women as mothers and goddesses, territory and 
nationalist politics is most prominent in the goddess figure of Bharat Mata (Mother 
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India), who rose to prominence in the late colonial period and was crucial in 
mobilizing communities for anti-colonialist activism. Personifying the nation as a 
female entity is a common feature around the world  . In ​The Goddess and the 2122
Nation​, Sumathi Ramaswamy provides an analysis of iconography and images which 
portray the physical body of Bharat Mata as superimposed onto a map of akhanda 
Bharat. Her analysis of “bazaar art”  from around the country depicting Bharat Mata 23
makes evident that she was represented in a variety of ways, depending on the 
sociopolitical context. While often conceptualized as the mother goddess of a secular 
nation, Bharat Mata was most often fashioned after Hindu goddess figures, adorned 
with multiple arms, jewelry and the lion as her vehicle. 
Bharat Mata was also often depicted in relation to the warrior goddess, Durga 
in some of her depictions. In popular Hindu iconography, Durga is most often 
depicted as a passionate warrior, as ​Mahisasurmardini ​(the slayer of the buffalo 
demon, Mahisasur), holding multiple weapons and symbolic artifacts in her ten 
arms. She is “the collective fire” of Vishnu and Shiva in a female form (Kovacs, 373). 
In Bankim Chattopadhyay’s iconic novel ​Anandamath​, the figure of Bharat Mata 
encompasses various forms of Durga over time. In the form of a “mother of the past”, 
she is Jagaddhatri ​ (Ramaswamy 109). In her present form, she is Kali, “haunting 
24
the cremation ground and dancing on Shiva’s chest, signifying the reversal of order 
21 For example, Britannia (Great Britain), Germania (Germany), Helvetia (Switzerland)  
22 Afsaneh Najmabadi’s discussion of Iran as a female beloved or mother points to the the contributions 
of patriotism “for the binarization of gender and the heteronormalization of sexuality” (97) 
23 Ramaswamy cites Patricia Uberoi’s definition of “calendar or bazaar art as a particular style of popular 
color reproductions with sacred or merely decorative motifs...the art style extends beyond calandars and 
posters. In fact it is a general ‘kitsch’ style which can be found on street hoardings, film posters, sweet 
boxes, fireworks, wall paintings and advertising and in the knick-knacks sold in fairs” (34). This 
illustrates the pervasiveness of goddess imagery and shows that common imagery blurs distinctions 
between “fundamentalist” and “secular”, drawing attention to the images which are central to nation 
building.  
24 A form of Durga, can be translated as ​“​the protector of the world ​”  
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and suggesting a parallel between the land of Bharat and a cremation ground”. In the 
future, the mother will take the supreme form of Durga, “the ten armed mother, the 
symbol of power with all her shining weapons” (Jha).​ ​Establishing a relationship 
between Bharat Mata and Durga was also essential to constructing the former as a 
divine figure.  
Bharat Mata’s relationship with Durga again draws attention to her seemingly 
paradoxical position: on the one hand, Bharat Mata is a vulnerable woman in need of 
protection, while on the other hand, she is fierce, angry, heroic warrior figures. Many 
early illustrations of Bharat Mata portray her as a solemn mother, robbed of her 
glorious past by imperialism and in need of protection by her children (Ramaswamy 
26). Other illustrations also depict her in a more angry, warrior like form, rousing her 
sons to revive the perceived grandeur of the pre-colonial, and for Hindu nationalists, 
pre-Mughal era (Ramaswamy 28). Bharat Mata, as a goddess and a woman, became 
the venerated symbol of the nation’s vulnerable “inner sphere”, its spiritual 
superiority, culture and tradition. As a mother, Bharat Mata was also conceived of as 
benevolent, and had bestowed upon “her children” the material resources found on 
the Indian landscape. Bharat Mata was also suffering and in​ “​times of crises”, like 
Durga, she was angry and roused her sons to protect her and preserve all that she 
had given them. These various characteristics of Bharat Mata made her an important 
symbol for anti-colonial nationalist struggles.  
The figure of Bharat Mata was also prominent in Hindu nationalist narratives 
in the colonial period, first with the construction of the RSS and later in the discourse 
and writings of the Samiti in the early-mid 20th century. For Hindu nationalists, the 
children of Bharat Mata were Hindu, and restoring her glory meant reclaiming her 
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not only from British colonialists but also Muslims. Within the RSS narrative, Bharat 
Mata was mostly construed as a suffering, domesticated figure: “The RSS’s Bharat 
Mata is a chaste mother, victimised by Muslims and in need of the protection of her 
virile sons” (Kovacs 375). In this version of Bharat Mata, physical strength is 
characteristic of masculinity while victimhood and vulnerability is characteristic of 
feminine figures. However, as I noted in the previous chapter, the early 20th century 
saw physical strength becoming an ideal for women in Hindu nationalists discourse. 
The co-existence of vulnerability and heroism has not been considered a paradox for 
Hindu nationalist organizations. In fact, in “times of crisis”, women took on the roles 
of “valiant warrior” and “sister-in-arms” due to their roles as mothers (Sethi 1547).  
Unlike the RSS, the Samiti, as the earliest women’s Hindu nationalist 
organization emphasized Bharat Mata’s relationship with the Devi Mahatmya ​, 
25
establishing her relationship with a variety of goddesses including Parvati, Durga, 
Kali and others. In the Samiti’s narrative, Bharat Mata is not a docile victim in need 
of male saviors and retains her strength, passion and rage. In fact, the image of 
Bharat Mata as a victimized figure is inverted as she is considered “‘the protector of 
society’”. In other Samiti texts, Bharat Mata is described as the creator of a “unique 
nation having glorious traditions”, “‘the very source of all power’, and ‘the origin of 
all divinities’” (Qtd in Kovacs 376; Qtd in Bacchetta 146). This draws attention to the 
fact that the ideology of the Samiti and its activism does not identically reproduce the 
narrative of the male counterpart organizations (Bachetta “Ideologues”) . Differences 
in the Samiti’s rhetoric in comparison to the Sangh also illustrate that the former not 
25 The Devi Mahatmya is a part of the Hindu scriptures, Puranas, and tells the story of Durga’s victory 
over Mahishasura  
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only makes female figures visible and prominent but also portrays them as complex 
and diverse characters.  
 
Nationalist Motherhood: Imparting Samskaras 
The invocation of goddess figures, such as Durga or Bharat Mata by the Samiti 
and other women’s organizations within the contemporary Hindu nationalist 
movement illustrate the ways in which considerable agency is accorded to these 
figures. For instance, the Samiti and RSS differ in the practice the festival of Vijaya 
Dashmi, which is also considered to be the founding day for both organisations:  
While for RSS the festival commemorates the victory of 
the god Rama over his enemy Ravana who had kidnapped 
Rama’s wife Sita, for the Samiti it is the day of the victory 
of the goddess Durga, of whom Rama is a devotee, over 
the demons. Although the ​Ramayana, ​the epic that 
recounts Rama’s exploits, contains both meanings, the 
Samiti has opted to emphasise female agency rather than 
male agency in its interpretation  
        (Kovacs 376) 
Women’s Hindu nationalist narratives resist, appropriate and change important 
aspects of the popular Hindu nationalist discourse. Moreover, goddesses and 
historical nationalist women have held prominence in the discourse of the Samiti 
since its advent and continue to do so in the recruitment and advocacy efforts of 
other Hindu nationalist women’s organizations. While female figures embody a 
variety of subject positions, they are most often mobilized for the production of a 
nationalist motherhood, which involves both the dissemination of samskaras and can 
also include warrior womanhood.  
Historical figures who were prominent in pre-colonial anti-Mughal and later 
anti-British struggles are celebrated in Hindu nationalist discourse at large. This 
draws attention to the construction of a narrative continuity from pre-colonial and 
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colonial era to the present, underscoring a Hindu struggle against ethnic Others. 
Within Hindu nationalist women’s discourse, female figures from the Mughal era, 
such as Rajput queen, Rani Padmini, the mother of the first king of the Marathas, 
Jijabai and the Maratha warrior queen, Rani of Jhansi are often invoked (Sethi 1550; 
Kovacs 376; Menon 35; Ganneri and Sen 283; Bannerji 175; Sarkar 193). This again 
shows that women’s historical narratives replicate important themes of Hindu 
nationalism while centering these narratives on female figures. The visibility 
accorded to these actors points to the construction of a female-centered Hindu 
nationalist historiography. Moreover, these stories constitute a nationalist female 
subject, mobilized in the service of Hindu nationalism. In this section, I will illustrate 
the ways in which these histories propagate nationalist motherhood through focusing 
on women’s stories of Jijabai. 
Jijabai 
Jijabai was the mother of the celebrated Maratha king Shivaji who resisted 
and fought against Mughal rule in present day Maharashtra in the seventeenth 
century. In Samiti narratives, Jijabai is held as the ultimate example of the ideal of 
maturtva ​(benevolent motherhood). Through a variety of stories and anecdotes, 
Hindu nationalist women across class and caste backgrounds ​ depict Jijabai as a 
26
strong-willed figure, dedicated to arousing Shivaji’s patriotism and inspiring him to 
struggle against Mughal rulers. In her ethnography, Menon recalls her experience at 
26 Namrata Ganneri and Atreyee Sen​’​s comparative study on the historical figures of import in the 
Samiti​’​s written and Mahila Aghadi​’​s oral stories points to the ways in which these stories enable a 
construction of female subjecthood across class and caste lines.Ganneri and Sen make evident that 
stories of Jijabai are also prominent in the Mahila Aghadi, an organization associated with the Shiv Sena 
and made up largely of lower-class and/or caste women living in slums in Bombay. Samiti and Aghadi 
women tend to differ in the historical figures which they invoke. However, Jijabai remains a a prominent 
icon for both organizations. Ganneri and Sen have argued that this indicates a method by which ​“​women 
across class, caste and organizational backgrounds attempt to forge powerful ties to universal 
motherhood and womanhood ​” ​(Ganneri and Sen, 283). 
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a ​shakha ​meeting in Sultanpuri in Delhi, where Samiti member, Aparna Pandit, was 
retelling a story of Jijabai to a group of young women from a small and historically 
excluded community of Balmikis ​.  Aparna claimed that the story, which had been 
27
published earlier, in the January-March 1999 issue of the Samiti’s shakha​ ​guide 
(“ ​boudhik pustak”​), was important as “it would teach…[the young women] the 
importance of being ‘active’ and ‘aware’” (Menon 32). This demonstrates how Aparna 
rouses nationalist sentiment in the audience by telling a history of Hindu oppression 
and resistance. Additionally, the vignette draws attention to the context in which 
Jijabai is operationalized within Hindu nationalist ideology:  
One day when Shivaji was a boy, he was sitting with his 
mother. From where they were sitting they could see a hill 
upon which was flying a green flag. His mother said to 
Shivaji that when he grew up he would have to fight so 
that the flag on top of the hill would be our saffron flag 
and not the green flag of the foreigner’s ​raj ​. In the printed 
version of the vignette Shivaji asks Jijabai, while playing 
an Indian dice game called ​chauser, ​‘What are the terms 
for victory’? In her response she points to a green flag on 
top of the nearby Kondana Fort and asks that it be 
replaced by a different color when she wins the game. The 
next sentence states that Shivaji satisfied these ‘inspiring 
terms for victory’  
          (Qtd in Menon 32)  
This anecdote insinuates that Shivaji’s commitment to the nation and his ability to 
succeed had been a result of Jijabai’s patriotic values and dedicated motherhood. 
This specific vignette also sheds light on the anti-Muslim framework within which 
this story of the everyday relationship between mother and son operates. While an 
earlier, printed version of this story makes the Muslim adversary explicit, Aparna 
refurbishes this paradigm using a metaphor of flags with colors associated with 
27 ​These group of young women are of Dalit background and ​“​had been resettled from slums in central 
Delhi in one of the various attempts to ​‘​clean up ​’ ​the city during the Asian games in the early 1980s ​”​. 
(Menon 32) 
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Hindu nationalism (saffron) and Islam (green). Nevertheless, the vignette places 
more emphasis on Jijabai’s dedication to a “nationalist” cause which she inspires in 
her son. Thus, Aparna is able to show the young girls how they, “under the guidance 
of the Samiti, can participate in the construction of the nation” (Menon 33). 
Moreover, this scenario shows that the story of Jijabai is used both for rousing 
women to participate in the movement as well as “to transmit cultural ideals, their 
understandings of the past and women’s roles in it” (Menon 33).  
Narratives of Jijabai construct a “mythico-history”, inserting female figures in 
normative nationalist historical narratives and inspiring women in the present day to 
cultivate an ideal motherhood. In the above anecdote, the figure of Jijabai was 
instrumentalized for inspiring young women to become politically involved, 
indicating their capacity to effect significant change in the nation. Jijabai’s awareness 
of a history of victimhood, reverence for Maratha culture and patriotic dedication to 
defeating the Mughal “Other” are imbibed by Shivaji, who went on to become 
victorious. In other stories, Jijabai is also tactical and superior to Shivaji: “Shivaji 
was said to have sought guidance from his mother (ranging from strategies of war to 
daily governance), and his mother persuaded him to sustain the war against the 
Muslims [sic] ” (Ganneri and Sen 296). This draws attention to the fact that Hindu 28
nationalist women’s discourse considers mothers positions as powerful and crucial in 
the formation of the nation, placing emphasis on the process of implanting 
samskaras in their children. Nevertheless, most often, it is sons who are involved in 
the material, “outer”, sphere of overt political action. Thus, ideal womanhood here is 
again imagined a preservation of the “inner” sphere, the “natural” and superior 
28 Shivaji fought for the Marathas against the Mughal rulers, not “Muslims”.   
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culture, which is the backbone of the “outer” sphere. The figure of Jijabai, as the ideal 
nationalist mother, indicates the emphasis being placed on women to pass down a 
memory of victimhood as well as a reverence for tradition, encourage patriotic fervor 
and support defensive battles against “Others” using practical and tactical means.  
Samskaras  
The significance placed on imbuing children with samskaras in Hindu 
nationalist organizations parallels Jijabai’s role in developing Shivaji as a patriotic 
warrior. Thus, ideal mothers are not seen only as vessels for reproduction of (male) 
Hindu children but also as responsible for developing in them Hindu cultural values 
and a knowledge of the community’s history in them. M.S Golwalkar, the second 
sarsanghchalak​ ​of the RSS emphasized this in his “‘Call to Motherhood’”:  
‘Let our mothers make the children wake up early in the 
morning, make them salute their elders, and offer worship to 
the family deity.’ They should teach girls to avoid European 
dress and not to ‘expose their bodies more and more’ and they 
children to resist ‘a blind aping of the West’. They should keep 
alive the observance of sacred occasions and ceremonies and 
take children on regular visits to temples.
  (Qtd in Sarkar 187) 
 
This makes evident that mothers are responsible for enforcing disciplinary practices 
which would contribute to the cultivation of Hindu nationalist subject. However, this 
concept is intertwined with the development of samskaras where discipline and 
devotion is not only to “elders” or the “family deity” but extended to include the 
larger Hindu nationalist ​parivar ​ and the nation. Sarkar explains: “ ​Samskaras… 
include deference to family elders, Hindu historical heroes and deities and to RSS 
great men” (188). This conception blurs the boundaries between family, deities, 
historical figures, the Sangh and the nation. Thus, nationalist mothers are important 
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for reproducing Hindu nationalist ideology, and in particular a concept of Hindu 
nationalism which is intimately related to the organizational structure of the Sangh. 
The relationship between women, families and Hindu nationalist 
organizations must be understood as already existing in a close knit network. 
Women’s organizations also expand the Sangh Parivar most often through forming 
and maintaining relationships with other women within the community. The Samiti 
influences women’s decisions in terms of marriage, education and career. Through 
being involved in the members’ families, the Samiti maintains community cohesion. 
If a member or someone from their family is in a medical or emotional crisis, 
members of the Samiti and even ​Adhyapikas ​from the shakha​ ​(teachers) are 
intimately involved with a member’s relatives ​. Sarkar also notes that in case Samiti 
29
members lack access to a formal shakha structure, Samiti members redesign shakha 
activities including festivals and ceremonies in “a home-based format” similar to a 
“‘correspondence course” (200). These are also extended to newly married women 
who may not initially be able to be involved in shakha activities. This makes evident 
that the shakha, as a meeting ground, is not the only space for imagining and 
formulating the ideal female nationalist subject, but that this extends into home 
space. Moreover, draws attention to the fact that Samiti maintains a localized, 
regional structure, maintaining close-knit ties amongst members and enmeshed 
within existing social networks of families, relatives and friends. 
The Sangh and the nation are collapsed into the family sphere and destabilize 
binaries between a domestic, non-political private sphere opposed to a national, 
political public sphere. Hindu nationalist women are crucial to this network as 
29 For instance, if someone from a Samiti member​’​s family is ill, ​“​Samiti members take turns cooking and 
nursing ​” ​(201). 
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mothers imbuing samskaras, a sense of nationalist patriotic/piety, in their children. 
Within this framework the development of nationalist motherhood also involves 
instilling tradition, history and a political consciousness in women, with the 
intention that they would impart them to their children. As the story of Jijabai 
earlier made clear, these historical narratives comprise ideas of Hindu victimhood 
and resistance against Muslim and Christian “Others”. Thus, the concept of 
samskaras seek to capture Hindu nationalist ideology, including reverence for 
historical figures, deities and the Sangh, all working as devotees of Bharat Mata, 
towards the common goal of (re)establishing the Hindu Rashtra. 
 
Warrior Womanhood: Developing Militancy amongst the Durga Vahini 
While the Samiti constitutes female political subjects as powerful mother 
figures, warrior womanhood is not considered contradictory to women’s roles as 
mothers. For instance, a document by the Samiti reads: 
‘A Hindu woman is an eternal mother, a symbol of love, 
sacrifice, dedication, fearlessness, sanctity and devotion. 
The tender-hearted woman becomes bold and aggressive, 
if time demands.’ (Qtd in 
Kovacs 376) 
Motherhood is considered “eternal”, alluding again to its naturalness for female 
actors. Moreover, mothers are again defined in terms of “inner” qualities relating to 
tradition and spirituality (“sanctity”, “devotion”), as affectionate (“symbol of love”, 
“tender-hearted”) and “sacrific[ing]”, but also in terms of fierceness (“fearlessness” 
“bold”, “aggressive”). Recall here the figure of Bharat Mata as maternal, suffering and 
benevolent but also angry and passionate. The prevalence of this image shows that in 
moments of urgency, when Hindu society and/or nation are under threat, that 
warrior womanhood becomes a requisite for women. 
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For Hindu nationalist groups, urgency to develop the Hindu Rashtra is at least 
partly defined by a rising threat of the ethnic Other. For instance, Savitri Devi, who 
was closely associated with the Sangh once explained the role of Hindu women in the 
face of a “threat” (eg. sexual violence) from the Muslim community: 
‘We would first of all like…the Hindu woman to ‘feel’ 
personally insulted whenever they come to know of any 
such action; that is an insult, not merely to such and such 
family or person but to the Hindus as a whole. They 
should feel ashamed and they should feel indignant; they 
should promote to action their husbands, their brothers, 
their sons.’          (Qtd in Sethi 1548) 
In this quote, it becomes apparent that cultivating Hindu womanhood involves 
becoming one with Hindu society, where they must “‘feel’ personally insulted” for 
“Hindus as a whole”. Here, women are not automatic symbols for Hindu society; that 
relationship must be cultivated. Women are implored to develop a sense of unity 
between self and society and consequently, of identical offense when either is 
violated or dishonored. Savitri Devi insinuates here that feelings of shame and anger 
must be directed at their male relatives, who were incapable of protecting Hindu 
society/them.  
Durga and Durga Vahini 
The relationship established between urgency, threat and honor are evident in 
the establishment of the Durga Vahini (literally: vehicles of Durga) , which formally 
developed in the early 1990s, around the Ramjanmabhoomi movement. Kovacs notes 
a document on the Durga Vahini which claims: “‘Today, Mother India is in danger 
again. And to save her, it is necessary that Durga’s power is revived”. Thus, the 
development of the Durga Vahini is intertwined with the notion that the “time has 
come”. Consider the origin story of the Durga Vahini on the VHP’s website: 
The blood-stained scenario in Ayodhya on that day rather 
forced them [Durga Vahini] to forsake their normal 
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female tenderness and affinity; and assume a most 
splendorous form by creating a living, sturdy womens 
wall around to protect their brothers who were being 
assaulted by the security forces with lathees and bullets
   (​vhp.org ​) 
Here, “tenderness” and “affinity” are seen as natural for women and it is the 
threatening situation, to Hindu society and to their brothers, which provokes women 
to act and even protect them. Moreover, the above quote invokes the image of Durga 
(“assume a most splendorous form”). Throughout the document, and in their very 
name, it is clear that Durga is the ideal figure whose ferocity the Durga Vahini must 
cultivate. The structure of the Durga Vahini follows that of the Samiti, but with an 
increased emphasis on physical training, including training in martial arts, “ ​chhurika 
(dagger wielding)” and shooting guns which are said to build their “self confidence” 
(vhp, Pahuja). 
Durga Vahini’s motto reads “Service, Security and Sanskars ”. These are 30
overlapping categories as the organizations is not only involved in social service for 
orphans, women and elders but also preventing “obscenity”, conversions, and 
banning “vulgar posters” (vhp). This illustrates the ways in which the Durga Vahini 
are involved in imbuing samskaras and discipline in the community and the nation 
as a whole. Moreover, VHP makes evident that developing young women’s samskaras 
are important for the development of society at large. Nevertheless, Durga Vahini 
also include debates on “noble progeny” in their discussions on building the nation. 
Regarding samskaras, the document also states: 
Since good Sanskars are imbibed by them [Durga Vahini], 
the mothers in the families also are becoming aware 
about our culture and Sanskars and therethrough we are 
getting succor for the formation of a healthy society. [sic]
(​vhp.org ​)  
30 Common spelling of samskaras 
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This illustrates an inverse relation, where the organization is like a mother, imparting 
sanskars in the Durga Vahini and the Durga Vahini in turn are imparting sanskars in 
their mothers. As young women responsible for imparting samskaras in their own 
families and in society at large, and as militants striving to embody Durga, the Durga 
Vahini are based on the conjecture that “time has come”. 
 
Women participants of the Hindu nationalist movement construe their 
position as nationalist mothers as a position of significant political power due to their 
responsibility to imbue samskaras in their children and amongst other women. 
Moreoever, warrior womanhood is imagined as another role, or a different 
manifestation which is not perceived as contradictory to moterhood but extended 
from it. Nationalist mothers are “provoked” into taking on militant roles due to the 
urgency of establishing the Hindu Rashtra, that is, a threat from Muslim 
communities. In what follows, I further elaborate on historical narratives of 
oppression and the construction of a future threat which has been central on 
producing a sense of urgency and mobilizing Hindu nationalist subjects to commit 
violent acts.  
 
III: De/Claiming the Nation 
Hindu nationalist ideology propagates a narrative continuity from past 
oppression at the hand of Mughal and British rulers, to present oppression, primarily 
from Muslims in India and Pakistan. As I noted in the previous chapter, women as 
nationalist mothers are central in cultivating a sense of eternal Hindu oppression in 
the form of samskaras and highlighting a tradition of resistance. In this chapter, I 
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illustrate how male and female Hindu nationalist subjectivity is formulated and 
mobilized for large-scale acts of violence. More specifically, I will focus on the 
speeches and performances of Sadhvi Rithambara in the lead up to the destruction of 
the 16th century mosque in Ayodhya, the Babri Masjid.  
Binaries of disciplined/unruly, abstinence/excess and benevolence/violence 
have been central to the characterization of the Hindu self opposed to a Muslim 
Other. Where “true” Hindus are imagined as vegetarian, monogamous and physically 
weak, Muslims are considered to be “gaubhakshak​” ​(cow-eaters), polygamous and 
strong. Here, the stereotype of Hindu men as effeminate/Muslim men as sexual 
predators also reflect a similar binary of austerity/excess. The sense of protecting 
Hindu society, territory, nation are predicated on conceptualizing the nation as the 
Bharat Mata, a feminine body which has been violated and must be reclaimed. Here, 
I find useful Bishnupriya Ghosh’s discussion of “unruly bodies” which are also 
associated with excess and must be disciplined.  
Ghosh argues that Hindu nationalism constructs Bharat Mata’s body, the 
national territory, as rendered impure, violated and dismembered, due to “foreign 
invasion” and the Partition. Consequently, the struggle to reclaim akhanda Bharat 
and establish the Hindu Rashtra are considered processes of purifying Bharat Mata’s 
sacred body. This struggle involves both, cleansing the polity through expelling 
Muslim people, as well as cleansing the territory through demolishing the Babri 
Masjid, which is considered a “taint” on the “sacral geography” of Bharat Mata 
(Ghosh 268). These again draw attention to intersecting notions of women’s honor 
and national honor.  
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Sadhvi Rithambara’s ability to establish the binary of austere/excess, 
unruly/disciplined is particularly germane due to her own position as a celibate 
ascetic. Moreover, Rithambara’s performances are especially important in signaling 
to Hindu nationalist members that the “time has come” to avenge historic injustices. 
This indicates that Rithambara is much like the nationalist mothers discussed in the 
previous chapter who are impelled to rouse male subjects to act in the face of 
violation. In other words, Sadhvi Rithambara’s own position as a ​female​ ascetic, 
most often rousing male Hindu nationalist subjects to preserve the sanctity of Bharat 
Mata, becomes particularly pronounced even though she has the privileges of male 
speech (Ghosh 271). 
In this chapter, I first expand on the relationship between sexualized bodies 
and national territory through analyzing the metaphors and stories which are central 
to Sadhvi Rithambara’s speeches. Second, I discuss Sadhvi Rithambara’s live and 
recorded performances which are central to the production of nationalist affect. 
Rithambara’s performances are central to developing a sense of unity, anger and 
urgency, and thus, mobilizing Hindu nationalist subjects to commit physical acts of 
violence. Lastly, I will focus on Rithambara’s own position as a female ascetic of the 
Hindu nationalist movement.  
 
Disciplining Others  
Moreover, these have been intertwined with the idea of pure Hindu women’s 
bodies which must be preserved and protected, most often from the perception of 
Muslim men as hypersexual and violent. While in my first chapter, I pointed to the 
ways in which these anxieties have transpired in struggles against a concept of Love 
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Jihad, these stereotypes are also evident in controversies surrounding the 
consumption of Indian and Western popular media ​. In a majority of these 
31
controversies, Hindu nationalists have also taken a position against cultural 
imperialism, alluding to the increase in public visibility of sex and sexuality, claiming 
that these are antithetical to “Indian culture” . These illustrate attempts at 32
essentializing Indian and Hindu culture (“us”) and demarcating it from Others 
through regulating portrayal of sexual bodies and desires.  
Limiting the portrayal of sexualized bodies and the sexualizing gaze also 
intersects with disciplining ethnic Others. Paola Bacchetta has argued that both 
“xenophobic queerphobia”, the expulsion of self-identified queer persons to a 
category of “non-Indian” (alluding to same-sex relations as “brought in” by British 
colonialists), and “queerphobic xenophobia”, the explicit and metaphoric assignment 
of queer identity categories to those considered ethnic Others, are central to Hindu 
nationalist ideology (“Exiles its Queers” 143-144). In other words, Hindu nationalist 
identity depends upon two intersecting forms of Othering: first, the disciplining of 
“unruly” or “queer” bodies ​—​“sexual outlaws who are nonproductive citizens such as 33
31 Ghosh points to disputes surrounding the legal controversy surrounding the screening of 1994 film 
Bandit Queen, ​the 1996 Miss World Pageant which took place in Bangalore, the television show 
Baywatch ​and ​ ​Deepa Mehta​’​s 1998 film, ​Fire, ​which showed same sex relations between two women. 
(262). Hindu nationalist groups have argued that such media exhibits content of a sexual nature which is 
against Indian (read: Hindu) culture and a consequence of the increasing Westernization of media. For 
other instances of Hindu nationalist criticism of popular media, ​see​ Jefferlot 
32 Most of these controversies also involve conceptions of Western media as uncultured and of Western 
women as immodest. These notions also have roots in the prominent in the colonial conceptions of 
British women as promiscuous which were also prominent in debates surrounding the “women’s 
question” amongst elite social reformers of the late colonial era (​See ​Chatterjee 1989).  
33 I would like to caution, like Bacchetta and Ghosh, that the term “queer” ​, ​and especially identity 
categories of homosexual, gay, lesbian or trans to describe same-sex relations or, for lack of a better 
term, gender non-conforming persons, has a complex genealogy. These identity categories cannot be 
unproblematically transplanted to Third World contexts. Thus, the term queer is utilized here as a 
“​transient theoretical measure ​”  ​to refer to ​“​dissonant-gendered ​” ​or sexed bodies (Bachetta 144-45, 
Ghosh 262).  
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the ‘sodomite,’ the ‘prostitute,’ the ‘lesbian’” ​—​ and second, the disciplining of Hindu 
nationalist Others- Christians, Muslims and Westernized Indians (Ghosh 262).  
Consider the case of the popular visual artist M.F Husain whose paintings of 
nude women were controversial, especially from the 1990s until 2006, when he 
moved to Qatar in self-imposed exile. Not only were his paintings condemned by the 
BJP and VHP, Hindu nationalist organizations such as the Shiv Sena and the Bajrang 
Dal attacked his home and studio, and defaced his art works. In 2006, Husain faced 
legal charges for his paintings depicting nude women, interpreted as Hindu deities 
(Ramaswamy 5). Husain’s own position as part of the national elite (often 
characterized as “Westernized”) and as a Muslim, make this even more objectionable 
for Hindu nationalists. Multiple Hindu nationalist groups claimed that Husain’s 
paintings were  a “cultural crime” and he “was accused of visually raping 
Hindu-Indian womanhood” (Ghosh 263). Reading his paintings as sexual violence 
draws attention to an attempt at regulating Husain’s gaze ​ ​in order to preserve the 
sacredness of the Hindu female body.  
 
Bharat Mata as an “Unruly Body”  
Hindu nationalist action establishes a relationship between the sacred space 
of the Hindu woman’s body and the the sacred feminized “geo-body” of Bharat Mata 
(Ramaswamy 36). As I pointed out in the last chapter, the figure of the 
mother/goddess Bharat Mata was juxtaposed with the pre-Partition map of India, 
the map of akhanda​ ​Bharat. Within this narrative the Partition is conceptualized as a 
“dismembering” of the sacred body of Bharat Mata. Regarding the Partition, 
Rithambara once said:“‘What do we have? An India with its arms cut off’” (Qtd. in 
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Ghosh 267). Goddesses including Bharat Mata are often depicted in Hinduism with 
multiple arms holding the boons the goddess bestows upon her devotees. Thus, the 
“we” Rithambara refers to here is Hindu society who have been estranged from the 
riches given to them by Bharat Mata. This also relates back to the discussion of 
women’s bodies as symbols of an “inner sphere”, as carriers of indigenous spirituality 
and tradition which endured the effects of British colonialism.  
In her speeches, Sadhvi Rithambara repeatedly draws parallels between the 
sexual violence committed on women’s bodies and the violence of ethnic divisions 
committed on the feminized territory of the nation. Rithambara’s appeals are an 
attempt to restore the sacralized female body/nation through eliminating “the 
excesses that have accrued on this body” (Ghosh 265). For instance, Rithambara 
argued against the Mandal Commission recommendations, which extended reserved 
seats for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in government education institutes ​, 
34
seeing it as a fragmentation of Hindu society. Similarly, Rithambara has also argued 
that “‘experiments in Hindu-Muslim unity’” can be understood as “a dissection 
‘carried out on the Hindu chest as if he is a frog, rabbit or cat’” (Qtd. in Ghosh 267). 
Here Muslim strength and violence is perpetrated against a weak or passive Hindu 
body​. The animalistic imagery employed here also contrasts other images of Muslim 
men as animals with large appetites, sharp teeth and claws (Bacchetta 152).  
The above statements illustrate Sadhvi Rithambara’s use of corporeal and 
animalistic metaphors to express discontent with the lost unity of Hindu society and 
an attempted unification of Hindus and Muslims as citizens in “secular India”. In 
another speech, Sadhvi Rithambara explicates the situation in Kashmir and links this 
34 Here I am referring to Rithambara​’​s disapproval of the Mandal Commission recommendations. ​See for 
instance, ​Pathak & Sengupta 
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to Hindus becoming a minority. She articulates these fears through simultaneously 
contesting Muslim personal laws which permit polygamy, claiming:  
‘The state tells us Hindus to have only two or three 
children. After a while, they will say do not have even one. 
But what about those who have six wives, have thirty or 
thirty-five children and breed like mosquitos and flies?’ 
                     (Qtd in Ghosh 267) 
Here, Rithambara not only emphasizes the threat of Muslim demographic 
supremacy, which I discussed in Chapter 1, but in claiming that Muslims are like 
“mosquitos and flies” she alludes to dengue and malaria, invoking images of disease 
implying that the nation has been contaminated. This becomes apparent as she 
follows up this statement with an image of the Indian landscape. She says: 
Why should there be two sets of laws in this country? 
Why should we be treated like stepchildren? I submit to 
you that when the Hindu in Kashmir became a minority 
he came to Jammu. From Jammu he came to Delhi. But 
you Hindus are on the run all over India, where will you 
go? Drown in the Indian Ocean or jump from the peaks of 
the Himalayas?         (Qtd in Ghosh 267) 
Thus, Rithambara sutures together images of unnatural reproduction, which has an 
influence on the relationship of Hindus with Bharat Mata (becoming “stepchildren”), 
and with her geo-body (“drown[ing] in the Indian Ocean or jump[ing] from the peaks 
of the Himalayas”). Rithambara brings together multiple images in her oration to 
provoke fears of Hindus becoming a minority and develop a position on the conflict 
in Kashmir. The juxtaposition of animalistic, reproductive and cartographic 
metaphors reiterate the perception that the body of Bharat Mata is suffering due to 
Muslims.  
Corporeal and animalistic metaphors which expound on the notion of a “sick 
body-politic” have also been a part of earlier Hindu nationalist rhetoric. For instance, 
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Bacchetta points to a statement by the prominent RSS leader, M.S Golwalkar who 
denounces Congress’ “secular territorial nationalism” by claiming that: 
It is like attempting to create a novel animal by joining 
the head of a monkey and the legs of a bullock to the main 
body of the elephant! It can only result in a hideous 
corpse…If at all some activity is seen in that body it is only 
of the germs and bacteria breeding in that decomposing 
corpse. And so it is that we see today the germs of 
corruption, disintegration and dissipation eating into the 
vitals of our nation for having given up the natural living 
nationalism the pursuit of an unnatural, unscientific and 
lifeless hybrid-concept of territorial nationalism 
   (Qtd. in Bacchetta 154) 
 Thus, secular territorial nationalism is perceived as a miscegenation of animal body 
parts which leads to the nation becoming a “decomposing corpse”. Golwalkar sees 
the integration of Hindus and Muslims results in a monstrous nation. Conceptions of 
“unnatural” and “hybrid” re-emphasize that Hindus are the only legitimate, natural 
children of Bharat Mata. Moreover, invocation of monstrous imagery highlights 
anxieties surrounding the relationship between bodies and the Other’s identity 
(Appadurai, “Dead Certainty”). This also connects the secular state to the unruliness 
of Bharat Mata’s body/landscape.  
 
Muslims and the Feminized Body Politic  
Sadhvi Rithambara alludes to contrasting images of the Indian state as an 
“unruly body” and Bharat Mata as a pure, healthy, giving body in a variety of subtle 
metaphors. The ways in which Muslims have tainted the pure, healthy body of Bharat 
Mata in apparent in this popular metaphor: 
Wherever I go, I say, ‘Muslims, live and prosper among 
us. Live like milk and sugar. If two kilos of sugar are 
dissolved in a quintal of milk, the milk becomes sweet!’ 
But what can be done if our Muslim brother is not 
behaving like sugar in milk? Is it our fault if he seems 
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bent on being a lemon in milk. He wants the milk to 
curdle. He is behaving like lemon in milk by following 
people like Shahabuddin and Abdullah Bukhari. I say to 
him, Come to your senses. The value of milk increases 
after it becomes sour. It becomes paneer. But the world 
knows the fate of the lemon. It is cut, squeezed dry and 
then thrown on the garbage heap. Now you have to decide 
whether you will act as sugar or like lemon in milk. 
The parable invokes three distinct images of becoming like “us” or becoming an 
“Other”. “Living like milk and sugar” appears as a directive for citizens, dissenting 
subjects as well as minorities, who are implored to dissolve in the nation. The first 
expression of antagonism against Muslims appears in the fact that they have not 
been integrating properly, “not behaving like sugar in milk”. In the second moment, 
Muslims are portrayed as something different altogether and as wanting to maintain 
this difference, they are “bent on being a lemon in milk”. What this means is made 
clear with the mention of prominent Islamic “fundamentalist” figures, Shahabuddin 
and Abdullah Bukhari. As a different entity, they are causing the milk to change into 
a different dairy product, paneer. In the last image, Rithambara returns to the lemon, 
the consumption of which is common knowledge: “It is cut, squeezed dry and then 
thrown on the garbage heap”. Here, the penalty for being a different entity, as 
Muslims, is explained as exploitation, execution and expulsion.  
Muslims are constructed not only as Others who are “among us” but also as a 
minority who, instead of integrating, are changing the very nature of the nation 
(curdling milk into paneer). Rithambara alludes to other minorities who have 
assimilated better than Muslims, for instance: 
the sugar image evokes the reputed Parsi lore of entering 
India, begging for asylum, promising to dissolve among 
Hindus like sugar in milk, thereby sweetening the body 
politic but not occupying space or insisting on cultural 
difference.         (Ghosh 268)  
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Furthermore, the allegory is inspired by the poetry of Tulsidas for whom lemons are 
symbolic of selfishness. Rithambara’s invocation of lemons again alludes to the 
binary of Hindu benevolence opposed to Muslim selfishness.  
The use of milk in this parable is also striking, considering the significance 
placed on cows in the Hindu/Indian imaginary. Cows have held significance in 
Hinduism especially due to their association with Lord Krishna, who is a cowherd 
and also affectionately known as ​makhan chor ​ (butter thief). Peter van der veer also 
notes the importance of cows for brahminical rituals and the significance placed on 
the usefulness of cows in providing milk, which can be turned to other dairy 
products. In late colonial North India, the figure of ​Gau Mata ​(Mother Cow) 
developed in similar ways to Bharat Mata, both being nurturing, benevolent mother 
figures symbolic of indigenous identity.  
Moreover, the cow as a divine mother goddess, also had to be protected from 
“beef-eating” Muslims. These notions manifested in cow protection movements in 
North India from 1880 to 1920, many of them organized by the “Gau Raksha Sabha” 
(Society for the Protection of Cows) (van der Veer 83-99; Bacchetta “Babri Masjid”, 
264; Gupta “Icon of Mother”, 4296-7). People were mobilized to boycott Muslim 
shops and a variety of bills were proposed to protect cattle and curb butchers. 
Gendered readings of these movements also point to the prominence of the belief 
that cow-killing had lead to Hindu men “grow[ing] weak and poor from a lack of milk 
and ghee” under British colonialism ​. Thus, “the body of the cow itself was invested 
35
35 For instance, one member of the early Hindu nationalist organization, Hindu Mahasabha claimed:  
Today our mother cow is being slain by the infidels in innumerable 
numbers ​…​Our helplessness, mental weakness and physical impotency 
is explicitly telling us that among the many reasons for such changes 
[today], the main one is the decline of cow wealth 
Lectures, letters and pamphlets of prominent members of the cow protection movement also used 
gendered imagery. For instance, one letter read: 
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with the divine and she herself became the proto-nation” (Gupta, “Icon of Mother” 
4295). Contemporary Hindu nationalists have also organized to protect cows. 
“Gau-Raksha” movements became formally organized under the VHP in the early 
1990s due to the efforts of another prominent Sadhvi, Vijayraje Scindia. Earlier this 
year (2015), beef became banned in the states of Maharashtra and Haryana (“A Ban 
on Beef in India is not the Answer”).  
Additionally, milk is also literally associated with Bharat Mata’s maternalism. 
Milk establishes an important connection between the subjects of the nation who 
have been birthed and nurtured by Bharat Mata. Sumathi Ramaswamy makes this 
evident in her analysis of an image of Bharat Mata published in ​Intiya ​magazine in 
1909. In the image Bharat Mata appears superimposed on a map of ​ ​akhanda Bharat, 
suckling four infants: “through suckling the shared mother’s milk…the four infant 
citizens are conjoined in a web of sibling intimacy that may be characterized as 
patriotic milk kinship” (24).  
Thus, the invocation of milk in the lemon-sugar-milk parable insinuates to its 
association with cows and mothers. Both are venerated in their form of Gau Mata 
and Bharat Mata and have been important symbols of Hindu society and national 
subjecthood since the late colonial period. As mothers, they are considered 
benevolent and important for cultivating strong Hindu children, while as women, 
they are also associated with purity, chastity and vulnerability. Moreover, the hindi 
for curdled milk is also a sexual metaphor and highlights “the defiling of the feminine 
purity of associated with cows and milk” (Basu 166). Thus, Sadhvi Rithambara’s 
Mard unhi ko janen jo rakshak hain Gau Mata ke 
(We consider as men only those who are the protectors of mother 
cow.)  
(Qtd in Gupta 4296) 
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repeated iteration of this metaphor illustrates her ability to wield together powerful 
imagery of a body politic, imagined as a mother/goddess, infiltrated by Muslims.  
 
Body and Territory: the Babri Masjid Agitation  
Sadhvi Rithambara’s call to heal the body of Bharat Mata which has become 
“unruly” or “sick” extends to Indian territory which is ideally imagined as akhanda 
Bharat. The concern over the fragmentation of Bharat Mata is not only with regards 
to the Indian polity but also the sacralized physical landscape. Within this rhetoric, 
the Babri Masjid features as a physical taint on Bharat Mata’s body.  
The Babri Masjid demolition took place on December 6, 1992. Militant Hindu 
nationalists razed the mosque using hammers, pipes and sticks in an operation which 
took approximately fourteen hours. The operation took place in the presence of 
“vastly outnumbered and out-armed police” (Bacchetta 2000, 256). Associated 
violence took place between Hindu and Muslim communities in various cities across 
India and also in immigrant communities in England. In India, the National 
Women’s Conference reported cases of sexual violence against Muslim men and 
women. The BJP was voted into power in 1998, their manifesto including her 
commitment to constructing the Sri Ram Mandir (Rama Temple) at the site of the 
Babri Masjid. The significance placed on the Babri Masjid indicates its symbolic 
value in Hindu nationalist ideology as a physical manifestation of the perception that 
Hindus and Muslims are inherently different and have been eternally in conflict.  
Before the demolition of the Babri Masjid, Sadhvi Rithambara delivered a 
famous speech inciting a large crowds of supporters in Delhi (henceforth referred to 
as the Babri Masjid speech). In a video of the speech, Rithambara is rousing the 
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audience in rhyming couplets of metaphors and stories. Interspersed within her 
dialogue is a call to her audience to raise their arms with her and chant after her: 
“Kaho garv se! ‘Hum Hindu Hain! ​Hindu ​stan humara hai!’ ​(Say with pride! ‘We are 
Hindu! ​Hindu ​stan is ours!)” . Each time, she reminds the crowd that in demolishing 36
the mosques, they, as Hindu nationalist subjects, are standing up against Muslims. 
For instance, she poetically claims:  
Ram-Krishna-Ganga ka birodhi jo humse takrayega 
woh kutte ki maut yahan par dekho mara jayega”  
(The opponents of Rama-Krishna-Ganga who challenge 
us / over here, have a look, they will die a dog’s death) 
 
and again soon after:  
Durga ke beton ko jinh ne lalkara hai, kaho garv se, 
“Hum Hindu Hain! ​Hindu ​stan humara hai!” 
(Those sons of Durga who have been provoked, say with 
pride/ ‘We are Hindu! ​Hindu ​stan is ours!) 
 
In these statements Sadhvi Rithambara constructs the audience’s unity, their 
relationship with India and antagonism towards Muslims. Through chanting and 
raising her arms, Rithambara energizes the crowd and presents the territory of  India 
(“Hindustan”) as the birthright of Hindus. Furthermore, she emphasizes the 
audience’s commitment to righteous action and antagonism towards Muslims by 
pitting Hindu subjects, as “sons of Durga” against Muslims who are “opponents of 
Rama-Krishna-Ganga”. Invoking divine figures, she reminds the audience of their 
religious duty while arousing feelings of aggression and strength. 
In both statements she also re-articulates that Hindus have been 
“challenge[d]” or “provoked” by Muslims and must rise up in defense. Thus, the 
continued existence of the Babri Masjid is portrayed as a present-day offensive action 
36 In her speech she stresses the “Hindu” in Hindustan  
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of Muslim violence against Hindus. Rithambara also inserts a specific site (“over 
here”) where Muslims will be brutally defeated (the animalistic proverb: “die a dog’s 
death”). In doing so, Rithambara situates the conflict in a physical territory where 
Hindus can assert their dominance. Emphasizing Hindu unity and strength, Sadhvi 
Rithambara insinuates that reclaiming the territory would be equivalent to 
reclaiming the nation-space for the Hindus.  
Here I find Paola Bacchetta’s analysis of the spatial significance of the Babri 
Masjid especially useful. Bacchetta argues that temples, within the Hindu nationalist 
imaginary are also constructed as an “inner”, domestic sphere, “a feminine space, an 
appropriate home to Hindu deities as well as Hindu nationalist sons”, in contrast to 
mosques which are masculine territory, associated with the body of Muslim men 
(“Babri Masjid”, 278). From this perspective demolishing the Babri Masjid is 
removing “a Muslim male body part violating the purity of the Mother(land) which 
Hindu males have failed to protect” and reclaiming the feminine body/territory 
which existed in the space (ibid., 279). Sadhvi Rithambara’s invocation of Durga in 
the above speech then serves not only as a reminder of the ferocity of the divine 
mother, but also of her purity and vulnerability which she implores the male subjects 
to protect. Thus, the Babri Masjid functions as both a symbol of Mughal military 
invasion and, in continuing to exist, a symbol of Hindu male weakness and 
effeminacy. From this perspective, the destruction of the mosque is more than a 
struggle over space but a symbolic “castration of the sexually aggressive Muslim 
male, and thus the restoration of Hindu male honor” (ibid.).  
 
Producing Nationalist Affect  
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Throughout this chapter, I have drawn attention to Sadhvi Rithambara’s 
speeches which imbricate the metaphoric and the real, mythic figures against the 
historical actors, women’s bodies and Bharat Mata, akhanda​ ​Bharat against the 
landscape of India. Bodily and animalistic metaphors alluding to “unruly” excessive 
bodies and pure, disciplined bodies are juxtaposed against historical and 
contemporary political actors and spaces. Combining a variety of images, 
Rithambara constructs a narrative continuity from the Mughal era to contemporary 
Indian politics, urging her audience to avenge a historical subjugation of Hindus by 
Muslims.  
Sadhvi Rithambara’s ability to transmit nationalist affect through 
performance is crucial to her appeal and the development of Hindu nationalist 
subjecthood. Often speaking in rhyming couplets, in a high pitched tone, Rithambara 
simultaneously transmits feelings of anger, vengeance, urgency as well as those of 
belonging, unity and moral righteousness. For instance, in the Babri Masjid speech, 
Rithambara spoke strenuously, without losing her breath. Recall here that her 1992 
live speech was also interactive as she asked her audience repeatedly to echo her 
words, “We are Hindu! Hindustan is ours!”, as she raised her both her arms above 
her head in a symbol of unified strength. Each time, she explicitly asked them to 
arouse in themselves feelings of nationalist pride (“say with pride!”). Mimicking 
Rithambara’s physical gestures and repeated utterances produces feelings of passion, 
collective determination and strength for her audience.  
Rithambara’s success in arousing feelings of nationalist reverence and 
devotion often depend upon the audience imitating her emotional performances. 
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Consider Menon’s account of a speech she attended by Rithambara in 1999 regarding 
the Kargil War ​:  
37
The large auditorium of the Constitution Club on Rafi 
Marg in New Delhi was filled to capacity, and yet the 
room was quiet as Sadhvi Rithambara’s voice trembled 
with emotion, and tears streamed down her face. Several 
in the room wept along with her, caught in the spell of her 
powerful oratory. As she continued her speech her voice 
became more angry and passionate until she was almost 
screaming the words to a silent auditorium: ‘On 
Islamabad’s chest will rest India’s flag, up till Rawalpindi 
and Karachi…up to the Indus River it will all become 
India. Then for eons and eons there will not be a devil like 
Jinnah. There will be a Kashmir but there will not be a 
Pakistan.            (91) 
 
Sadhvi Rithambara again invokes the figure of Bharat Mata, generating nationalist 
pride and assuring her audience of a better future. Here Rithambara, like other 
Hindu nationalist activists, was acting in accordance with the BJP lead initiative to 
focus on producing nationalist affect in the wake of the Kargil War ​. Rithambara 
38
construes the image of akhanda​ ​Bharat using bodily metaphors (“chest”)  alongside 
specific sites on the landscape (“Islamabad”, “Indus River” etc) and the historical 
figure of Jinnah. Menon has argued that this speech indicated the ways in which 
Rithambara’s speech contributes to “the processes through which individuals come 
to view themselves as subjects within specific ideological formations” (Menon 91). 
However, the audience interacts with Rithambara not only in the ideological sense 
but also through mimesis of her affective performance. By crying with her (in the 
above speech) or chanting and raising their arms along with her (in her Babri Masjid 
speech), the audience unintentionally reproduces Rithambara’s performance. Thus, 
37 Armed conflict between India and Pakistan took place primarily at the Line of Control in Kargil, 
Kashmir from May to July 1999 
38 Menon notes that with the upcoming elections looming, the BJP deflected attention away from media 
controversies surrounding intelligence data by focusing instead on ​“​produc[ing] nationalist affect 
through screening clips on national television about the soldiers who were dying in Kargil ​” ​(Menon 84) 
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Rithambara’s bodily actions appear to be crucial for the cultivation of Hindu 
nationalist subjecthood as she serves as a model, making evident to the audience the 
affective responses they must produce.  
Notice also the transformation from feelings of sorrow to the rising feelings of 
rage and passion. Menon describes her rising voice as reflecting the rising feelings of 
anger, reaching the moment when the Indian flag finally reclaims the body/territory 
of Bharat Mata (“on Islamabad’s chest will rest India’s flag”) . The saffron flag and 
the trident (Lord Shiva’s weapon) have been important symbols for multiple Hindu 
nationalist organizations. Ghosh observes that Rithambara’s invocation of a phallic 
flag image “fly[ing] over the maternal body body-politic”, often occurs in tandem 
with her rising voice. Ghosh argues: “The mounting crescendo itself performs a 
phallic rise, drawing to a resounding close various stories and parables…” (266). 
Moreover, this rising pitch of Rithambara’s voice also transmits feelings of deep 
strain and urgency. This is also apparent in Sarkar’s response to one of Rithambara’s 
popular cassettes: 
For over sixty minutes, extreme stress is continuously 
conveyed and the speech seems to be improvised as if on 
a battlefield—an inspired voice speaking recklessly from 
the gut           (1995; 194) 
 
These responses make clear that Rithambara’s performance are important for 
producing feelings of passion, urgency, anger, and unity, and for guiding the 
audience to perform Hindu nationalist subjecthood.  
 
Live versus Recorded Performance 
The nationalist affect produced in Rithambara’s live performances is 
crystallized in audio cassettes, and more recently, in video recordings available 
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online. These recordings make Rithambara’s speeches a preserved artifact which 
changes the production of her performance, makes her accessible to diverse 
audiences, especially women who might not have access to her public performances. 
While the interactive, ​maidan ​(plaza) setting prompts the audience to perform in 
specific ways, the change in soundscape shifts the modes of interaction and the 
affective meanings produced for the audience. Moreover, her live performances tend 
to be responding to certain political situations, recorded speech allows her 
performance to be reproduced multiple times in different micro and macro 
sociopolitical contexts.  
In live performances, Rithambara is most often speaking from atop a stage 
and is interacting most often with male Hindu nationalist members. Their collective 
responses, in laughter, chants or prayer, would emphasize their unity, their “patriotic 
milk kinship” and a collective adherence to the Hindu nationalist cause. In contrast, 
Rithambara’s archived speeches might develop a more private relationship with the 
listener(s), shifting the interactivity such that the listener(s) is/are now the agent 
capable of regulating her speech, playing it multiple times, pausing, fast-forwarding 
or rewinding etc. Moreover, her performance can also be accessed in different 
locations which might also make different stories or metaphors more relevant. For 
instance, played in the car, her allusions to the moral decay of everyday life could 
become more salient while played in the home, her invocation of domestic politics 
and metaphors become more powerful and enhance her appeal for women.  
While so far, I have noted multiple situations where her call to action is 
directed to the sons of Bharat Mata, Rithambara does not sever women’s relationship 
with Bharat Mata and emphasizes their significance for the Hindu nationalist 
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movement. In a speech establishing soldiers who died in the Kargil War as martyrs 
who sacrificed for Bharat Mata, Rithambara praises their mothers and widows, 
saying: 
Our greatest respects at the feet of those who gave their 
lives at the feet of Bharat Mata. We salute that mother’s 
womb, that mother’s lap, that mother’s love, her affection, 
in whose shadow our country’s brave soldiers learned to 
sacrifice for their motherland. We salute those widows 
who laid their ​sindhuri ​(married) nights, their happy 
days, at the feet of Bharat Mata.    
         (Qtd in Menon 90) 
Here, Rithambara is drawing a parallel between the “feet of Bharat Mata” and the 
“feet”, “womb[s]” and “lap[s]” of nationalist mothers who have produced and 
nurtured soldiers who fight for the protection of their collective mother, Bharat 
Mata. Moreover, Rithambara not only extolls the mothers who have cultivated male 
Hindu nationalist subjects but also the sacrifice of wives, alluding to sexual 
metaphors (“ ​sindhuri ​nights, their happy days”). Here, it becomes apparent that 
women’s roles, as benevolent, sacrificing mothers and wives are significant for the 
Hindu nationalist movement. Recall also Rithambara’s statement regarding her own 
relationship with her mother: “If Shahabuddin has drunk his mother’s milk, I have 
also drunk my mother’s milk” which I cited earlier. Here, it can also be inferred that 
Rithambara is also alluding to the importance of her own mother in cultivating in her 
a Hindu nationalist subjecthood. In this sense, she is similar to Hindu nationalist 
mothers, goading on male subjects to rise to restore the “unruly” body of Bharat 
Mata yet recognizing the contribution of the daughters of Bharat Mata in their roles 
as mothers and wives.  
The significance of these statements in Rithambara’s speech not only draw 
attention to Rithambara’s own position, as a woman renouncer, but also point to her 
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appeal to women, and relatedly to families. Besides praising women for their 
association with the Hindu nationalist project, Rithambara also weaves in domestic 
metaphors and politics in her speeches. Recall here the lemon-sugar-milk parable 
which invokes a common domestic scene. Listening to a metaphor based on making 
paneer produces different affects for a male audience gathered at Rithambara’s live 
performance, for whom this activity might be more distant, than for a female 
audience listening to the parable at home, for whom this activity would be more 
familiar. Considering the intermeshed, family like network within which Hindu 
nationalist organizations operate, these cassettes allow Sadhvi Rithambara to 
become a familiar, household name. 
 
Renunciation and Politics  
Central to Sadhvi Rithambara’s powerful position in Hindu nationalist 
movements is her role as an ascetic. Ascetic men and women (Sadhus or Sadhvis 
respectively) are dedicated to achieving ​mokṣa, ​liberation from ​samsara ​(the cycle of 
birth, death, and rebirth). Theoretically, Sadhus and Sadhvis are supposed to live in 
austerity, devoid of material attachments and away from society to achieve this goal 
through meditation. Sadhvis and Sadhus from Hindu nationalist and other 
organizations have argued against this concept in a variety of ways. Kalyani Devaki 
Menon shows that Sadhvi Rithambara draws on the Bhagavad Gita (hereafter the 
‘Gita’), a Hindu scripture which part of the epic, ​Mahabharata, ​to argue that her 
political action is inspired by sacred duty. She says:  
To live in the face of death? To live in the world and yet be 
free from the world? Have we ever fulfilled our duty by 
sitting in the forest? This is why even renouncers have to 
help society while staying free of human affairs (​insani 
batein). ​We have to fulfill our duty/responsibility (​daitva) 
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not run away from it. We should not run away from 
problems. Today it is very important for India (​Bharat) ​to 
understand the message of the Gita (Qtd in Menon 80) 
The above quote makes evident that for Rithambara sociopolitical involvement and 
action are essential features of the spiritual path and do not impede Sadhvis from 
remaining detached from the material world. The message of the Gita here achieves 
two ends: it inspires Hindu citizens of India to take seriously their (religious) duty 
towards the nation and also serves to justifies her own position as a renouncer in the 
Hindu nationalist movement.  
The relationship between political action and renunciation which Sadhvi 
Rithambara advocates can be understood as an extension of the value of ​seva 
(service). The relationship between renunciation, community service and political 
action was also a crucial for anti-colonial nationalist figures in the late nineteenth 
century. For instance, Swami Vivekananda “argued that renouncers should 
participate in the religious and cultural revival of the nation and engage in efforts to 
ameliorate the socioeconomic conditions of the country” and made ​seva ​a 
requirement at his monastic organization, the Ramakrishna Order​ ​(Menon 86). The 
association between renunciation and political action was also central to M.K 
Gandhi’s anti-colonial nationalist project. Gandhi too considered the Gita an 
important text for mobilizing nonviolent action (Menon 87).  
 The image of Gandhi as simple and selfless was appealing to diverse religions, 
classes, castes and regions. Gandhi’s ascetic lifestyle was important for the creation 
of a supra-local, Indian national identity. Sadhvis and RSS ​pracharaks ​(preachers) 
also appear to be committed to be beyond selfish pursuits and committed to a larger, 
objective out of religious duty. This is important as Sadhvis also want to gather 
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people across caste, class and region to congeal a “mega-ethnic grouping”, a national 
scale Hindu identity (Appadurai, “Dead Certainty”, 277).  
This prominence of Sadhvi Rithambara and other female ascetics suggests 
that it is not simply the ascetic lifestyle but also their femaleness which accords them 
a powerful position in the Hindu nationalist movement. Following Amrita Basu’s 
argument, I would contend that, for one, the sexuality of Sadhvis is conceived of as 
less dangerous than that of other women due to their celibacy (Basu 162). Sadhvis are 
conceived of as chaste and pure which endows them with a moral authority. 
Moreover, Sadhvi Rithambara is similar to nationalist mothers in that she uses her 
position as a woman to goad male subjects to protect and reclaim Bharat Mata’s lost 
honor. This was evident in her Babri Masjid speech, Rithambara roused the male 
subjects by urging them to dispel their weaknesses and demonstrate their collective 
unity and aggression through direct action. However, as a renouncer of the material 
world, she is also not required to adhere to gender specific conventions with regards 
to family, intimacy, marriage and domestic space. Her performance further 
illustrates a transgression of sex-typed roles where Rithambara is granted the 
privileges of male speech, evident in her use of violent metaphors, aggression and 
sexual innuendoes and aggression to depict Bharat Mata. 
 
Within the Hindu nationalist narrative, Muslims are construed as past 
oppressors from the Mughal era as well as a future threat due to their perceived 
appeasement by the Indian secular state. These images which arouse feelings of 
anger and powerful resistance are juxtaposed with images of feminine purity, the 
disciplined body of Bharat Mata and other divine mothers, which fuel feelings of 
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belonging and righteousness. Here, “the idealized sacral body of the motherland is 
always the ​nostalgic dream ​” (emphasis mine, 265). Thus, Rithambara is involved in 
constructing an imagined national future, the Hindu ​Rashtra, ​which is concurrently 
the revival of a “glorious past”. 
Conclusion 
I was inspired to write this project after watching the film, ​The World Before 
Her ​by Nisha Pahuja. The film juxtaposes the Miss India Beauty Contest against the 
Durga Vahini. I was interested in the motivations for the participants to be actively 
involved in a movement that has long been associated with violence. Moreover, 
considering the context of the Narendra Modi’s elections, I was especially interested 
in the sociopolitical contexts which inspire citizens to be involved in a nationalist 
movement.  
Throughout the process of researching and writing this project, there have 
been numerous riots instigated against Muslim communities, churches have been 
attacked, there has been increased censorship of popular media, bills proposing a 
ban on forced conversions and the more recent ban on beef. Looking to the gendered 
formation of the Hindu nationalism movement, the roles women occupy within it 
and its relationship to past and present violence has been an important process, 
relevant in the current Indian context. Moreover, these have given me insight into 
the theories of exclusion and inclusion, ideologies of territorial nationalism and the 
colonial histories of the movement.  
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